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Chapter 3: Torture  
1 Introduction 
The international legal agreements that prohibit the bodily harm defined by the term 
‘torture’ are particularly stringent and well entrenched.  A basic protection against torture is 
enshrined in the post-World War II human rights agreements, and with adoption of the 
1984 Convention Against Torture, which has over one hundred state signatories who have 
additionally passed domestic legislation to comply with its mandate, the prohibition of the 
use of torture became one of the most well-established human rights norms in existence.1   
Despite this general agreement within international society against the use of 
torture, the Bush administration faced numerous accusations of torture, particularly in its 
choice to use what it called ‘enhanced interrogations’ for intelligence-gathering purposes.  
These accusations are particularly problematic if one considers that the United States 
traditionally supported the prohibition against torture to a degree over and above other 
human rights commitments.  The Convention Against Torture was signed and ratified by 
Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush respectively,2 both of whom came from a political 
party that has traditionally avoided ‘idealism’ in international affairs instead having a 
tendency to “judge international agreements and institutions as means to achieve ends.”3  
This was particularly striking since the United States, which has a history of rejecting treaties 
that are seen to breach US sovereignty, not only agreed to the implementation of universal 
jurisdiction, but openly advocated for it on the basis that torture was “an offence of special 
international concern.”4   
                                                     
1 Hawkins, "Explaining Costly International Institutions," 783.  Despite this legal entrenchment, there is some 
debate over the effectiveness of the Convention Against Torture in providing protection to citizens in 
authoritarian signatory states.  In highly authoritarian states, there is some suggestion of a positive correlation 
between the use of torture and being a signatory to the regime.  See Oona Hathaway, "Why Do Countries 
Commit to Human Rights Treaties?," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 4 (2007).  Despite this possible 
counterintuitive effect with highly authoritarian states, there is still an overall correlation between a fall in the 
level of torture perpetrated by states and signing the convention. 
2 Hawkins, "Explaining Costly International Institutions," 794-96.   
3 Robert B. Zoellick, "A Republican Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 79, no. 1: 69.   
4 Hawkins, "Explaining Costly International Institutions," 789. 
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Given the rapid transformation of US torture policy in the war on terror, from 
accepting it as a human rights norm even over and above long-standing issues of 
sovereignty and political party preferences to actively using techniques that arguably 
constitute torture for counterterrorism purposes, the question of whether this dramatic 
change might have repercussions on torture norms within wider international society is 
even more prescient.  However, I argue that there is little evidence that the Bush 
administrations defection from the torture norm created a norm cascade favoring their 
preferences.   
The analysis, however, is not completely straightforward, as on the one hand, the 
Bush administration’s attempt to legitimate their actions within international society did not 
challenge the norm against torture itself, but rather challenged what actions it forbade.  The 
Bush administration attempted to push against the boundaries of what might or might not 
be considered acceptable conduct, arguing for utilizing techniques that were arguably 
within the penumbra of uncertainty with respect to what constitutes torture.  In addition, 
when confronted with US human rights abuses, other members of international society 
expressed their horror at their conduct and called for investigations.   
On the other, with the exception of states with poor human rights records, states 
publicly avoided calling the US conduct “torture’ and some US legitimation strategies were 
replicated by a small number of states.  Expanding on Ann Florini’s argument concerning the 
purpose of international secrecy, this might indicate that the conduct of the United States 
for the most part was not sufficiently grievous in the eyes of other members of international 
society that they would risk the costs of a legitimation struggle, preferring to stay quiet 
unless the abuse rose to a particular threshold, such as when the Abu Ghraib scandal 
broke.5  However, by the end of the Bush administration’s second term some states were 
changing detainee policy to the detriment of the United States, and the Bush administration 
stopped all attempts to legitimate itself through appeals to international law, relying instead 
on domestic law.  Though the United States might have been successful in reaching a state 
                                                     
5 Florini, "The End of Secrecy." 
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of norm emergence for a period of time, there is no evidence that by the end of the Bush 
administration the United States had created a norm cascade that fundamentally shifted the 
international torture norms.  In fact, as time progressed there was an entrenchment of the 
norm as more and more states openly opposed the Bush administration’s policies. 
It is possible to read the relative silence from Western nations over whether the 
United States was torturing detainees, particularly when contrasted to the vocal opposition 
from states with poor human rights conduct, as a situation where even if the Western 
nations did not approve of US conduct, the US might have been able to leverage its material 
power to silence them.  In fact, off-the-record statements from European diplomats lend 
some evidence that this took place.  However, with respect to the book of Stephen Brooks 
and William Wohlforth that material advantage can generate long-term norm change, the 
case is far less clear, particularly as Western states became more vocal about the detainee 
mistreatment and began to institute detainee procedures that were disadvantageous to the 
United States.  This, despite the potential ability of the United States to lower the amount of 
opposition they faced in the public realm, this ability was limited and did not produce 
significant norm change in the manner that Brooks and Wohlforth suggested.   
The evidence supporting these claims will be examined in three sections.  The first 
section will review the major historical events surrounding the allegations of torture and 
review the internal discourses of the Bush administration as a way of setting the stage for 
the legitimation strategies that the United States and other members of international 
society undertook.  The next two sections will review thematically the legitimation 
strategies of the United States and other members of international society.   
Historical Timeline and Internal US Discourses 
This section examines the allegations made in the media concerning US treatment of 
detainees in the War on Terror to set the context in which the legitimation strategies of the 
United States and other actors in the international system operated.  It will also provide an 
overview of some of the off-the-record or private statements made by government officials 
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or employees that give an inside sense of the Bush administration’s attitude towards 
interrogations that demonstrated their intent to defect from the norm.   
Domestically, the United States appeared to have undergone a domestic norm 
cascade with respect to torture.6  There was a consistent minority, sometimes a plurality, 
who supported the use of torture.  For instance, in early October 2001, when asked whether 
the government should use torture, not just “rough interrogation techniques,” to extract 
information from detainees, 45% of the American public agreed and 53% disagreed 
according to a Gallup/CNN/USA Today poll.7  The percentage of American citizens who 
agreed that torture is sometimes or often permissible remained in the high thirties or low 
forties for the entire Bush administration, rising as high as 46% even after the majority of 
the torture scandals had occurred.8  Into the Obama administration, a 2009 poll found that 
52% of Americans supported the use of torture in some circumstances.9  Overall, the 
percentage of the public that thought torture was often or sometimes justified increased 
over time.10  This public support provides context for the political decisions made by the 
Bush administration, as they did not face the level of domestic opposition one might expect 
given the status of the prohibition of torture as a fundamental norm.  This gave the Bush 
administration more leeway to act, and presents a complication for the maintenance of the 
torture norm in international society.   
Initial Reports of Abuse 
The first reports that the United States was contemplating using harsher 
interrogation methods on detainees occurred only a month after 9/11, when the Federal 
                                                     
6 McKeown, "Norm Regress." 
7 Alfred Lubrano, "The Debate Is Torture over 9/11 Suspect's Fate," The Philadelphia Inquirer, 7 March 2003. 
8 This occurred in 2005, see Paul Koring, "Isolationist Sentiment Rising in U.S., Poll Says," The Globe and Mail, 
18 November 2005.  For more polling data:   Evan Thomas and Michael Hirsh, "The Debate over Torture," 
Newsweek, 21 November 2005; Denis Staunton, "Bush Forced to Retreat by Anti-Torture Senator," The Irish 
Times, 10 December 2005; Derek Klobucher, "Torture Backed When Threat High, Says Poll," ibid., 20 October 
2006; Patrick Worsnip, "Sizable Minority of Americans Condone Torture - Poll," Reuters Foundation, 
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N25481397.htm. 
9 GfK Roper Public Affairs & Media, "The Ap-Gfk Poll,"  http://www.ap-gfkpoll.com/pdf/AP-
GfK_Poll_Supreme_Court_Final_Topline.pdf. 
10 Jeremy D Mayer and David J Armor, "Support for Torture over Time: Interrogating the American Public 
About Coercive Tactics," The Social Science Journal 49, no. 4 (2012): 443. 
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Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reportedly considered the use of “truth serums’ and the CIA 
began to look into the use of rough interrogation techniques and high-decibel music to 
extract information.11  However, the first major scandal involving the suspected 
mistreatment of detainees began with the internment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba.  In January 2002 the British newspaper the Daily Mail printed photos of recently 
transferred detainees and argued that their treatment was not in line with the Geneva 
Conventions.  They claimed that the detainees were “chained, manacled, hooded and even, 
in a few cases, sedated … kept in cramped outdoor cages, open to the elements and to the 
attentions of possibly malarial mosquitoes.”12  Under this scrutiny, the United States 
seemed to make attempts to rectify the problems and concerns of other actors in 
international society.  For instance, on 24 January 2002, the United States suspended 
transfers to Guantanamo Bay citing a lack of space.  A representative of the American 
military was quoted as saying, “Rather than put ourselves in the position of bringing them 
out here and doubling them up in two per unit, which is not good from a detainee 
perspective or from a security perspective, we said, “Let’s hold on for a second.’“  An 
unidentified American military source in Washington suggested that this had something to 
do with the recent international pressure, that “they don’t want it to be perceived that 
we’re jamming them in there.”13   
In April 2002, CIA interrogation manuals from 1963, released for the first time in 40 
years, heightened the speculation over what the United States might be doing to 
detainees,14 particularly as they detailed the use of pain in interrogation.  This speculation 
was only strengthened as off-the-record comments from FBI agents suggested that they 
were considering the use of torture.15  The Associated Press reported that current 
                                                     
11 Walter Pincus, "Silence of 4 Terror Probe Suspects Poses Dilemma for FBI," The Washington Post, 22 October 
2001; Jason Burke, "The Secret War: Behind the Lines," The Observer, 4 November 2001.  
12 Stephen Glover, "Even the SS Were Treated Better Than This," Daily Mail, 15 January 2002. 
13 Katharine Q Seelye and Steven Erlanger, "A Nation Challenged:  Captives; U.S. Suspends the Transport of 
Terror Suspects to Cuba," The New York Times, 24 January 2002. 
14 Ron Kampeas, "They Have Ways of Making Al-Qaida Talk," The Associated Press, 28 April 2002. 
15 Kenneth Anderson, "What to Do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Terrorists? A Qualified Defense of Military 
Commissions and United States Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.," Harvard Journal of Law 
& Public Policy 25, no. 2 (2002). 
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interrogations involved having the detainee sit or stand for long periods, depriving him of 
sleep, isolation and changing the temperature of the room.16  The New York Times reported 
that although military officials stated that torture, including physical contact, was not an 
option for interrogations, anything short of this would be, including preying on a prisoner’s 
fears, desires, sexual stereotypes and cultural sensitivities.17  The Globe and Mail reported 
that when the military was questioning the detainees, they use “stress-positions,’ sleep 
deprivation, shackling, solitary confinement and humiliating living conditions.18 
In addition to the general reports of mistreatment, in early 2002 the media leaked 
information on the treatment of “high-value’ detainees, whom the United States targeted 
for harsher treatment.  Time Magazine reported that there was at least some initial 
discussion within the administration about extracting information from al-Qaeda leader Abu 
Zubaydah through torture.19  The Age reported that it took three months of “interrogation, 
sleep deprivation, solitary confinement and mental torture” to break Omar al Faruq, 
thought to be one of Al-Qaeda’s senior operatives in Southeast Asia, who reportedly 
divulged the information on the Bali bombings.20  A Western intelligence official later called 
his treatment “not quite torture, but about as close as you can get.”  It included food, sleep 
and light deprivation, prolonged isolation and subjecting him to temperatures that spanned 
from -10C to 40C.21  Both Ayub Ali Khan and Abu Zubaydah allegedly faced similar harsh 
treatment.22  This early behavior was later reflected in an October 2002 document released 
in 2008 where CIA counter-terrorism lawyer Jonathan Fredman told a meeting of 
intelligence and military officials gathered to extract better intelligence from detainees that 
                                                     
16 "Glance: U.S. Tactics Draw Fine Line," Associated Press Online, 28 April 2002. 
17 Eric Schmitt, "Ideas & Trends:  There Are Ways to Make Them Talk," The New York Times, 16 June 2002.   
18 Doug Saunders, "U.S. Walks a Fine Line to Make Prisoners Talk," The Globe and mail, 17 September 2002. 
19 Cited in "US Considered Allowing Zubaydah to Be Tortured for Information," The White House Bulletin, 8 
April 2002.  The Economist later reported that the United States used sleep-deprivation and denial of food:  "A 
Clear and Present Danger; Al-Qaeda," Economist.com, 17 September 2002. 
20 Mark Forbes and Marian Wilkinson, "Voices from the Shadows Predict Horrors to Come," The Age, 19 
October 2002. 
21 Raymond Bonner and Don Van Natta, Jr, "A Dark Jail for Qaeda Suspects," The International Herald Tribune, 
11 March 2003. 
22 For Kahn:  Omer Farooq, "Indian Detained after Sept. 11 Tells of Psychological Torture after Returning 
Home," Associated Press Worldstream, 2 January 2003.  Zubaida:  Olga Craig, "The Net Tightens around Osama 
Bin Laden," Sunday Telegraph, 9 March 2003. 
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torture “is basically subject to perception,” and that “if the detainee dies, you’re doing it 
wrong.”23  
By the end of 2002, the Washington Post reported that the United States was using 
interrogation methods that constituted torture.  It revealed that the CIA had an 
interrogation center in the Bagram air base in Afghanistan where al-Qaeda and Taliban 
suspects were kept awake for days with what were called “stress and duress” techniques.24  
Two prisoners held at the Bagram air base in Afghanistan were killed during their 
interrogation, the coroner’s report stating that they were likely mistreated in a manner that 
led to their deaths.  Both men exhibited blunt force trauma that led to their deaths by 
pulmonary embolism and heart attack respectively.25  According to Americans with direct 
knowledge of the general apprehension process, captives at Bagram were “softened up” by 
either Special Forces or Military Police who beat them before locking them up in tiny rooms.  
As one official who supervised the capture and transfer of suspected terrorists put it, “Let’s 
just say we are not averse to a little smacky face.  After all, if you don’t violate someone’s 
human rights some of the time, you probably aren’t doing your job.”26 
The treatment of detainees at Guantanamo led several FBI agents to file complaints 
with the FBI administrators, including beatings and the exploitation of the detainees” 
sexuality and religious beliefs, hooding, denial of food and water, sleep deprivation, use of 
loud noises and strobe lights, the use of dogs, and extreme temperatures.27  After the 
scandal at Abu Ghriab, the FBI solicited further reports from Guantanamo, where agents 
reported detainees being held in cells for over 24 hours, denied food and water, beaten, 
with many found in fetal positions after having urinated or defecated on themselves, or 
                                                     
23 Joby Warrick, "CIA Played Larger Role in Advising Pentagon," The Washington Post, 18 June 2008. 
24 Dana Priest and Barton Gellman, "U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations," ibid., 26 December 2002. 
25 Andrew Gumbel, "American Admits Suspects Died in Interrogations," The Independent, 7 March 2003; 
Jonathan Turley, "U.S. 'Interrogations' Border on Torture," The Times Union, 11 March 2003. 
26 Craig, "The Net Tightens." 
27 James P Pfiffner, Torture as Public Policy:  Restoring U.S. Credibility on the World State  (Boulder, CO: 
Paradigm Publishers, 2010), 1319-20. 
67 
 
 
 
where the temperature in the room was left so hot that the detainee started pulling out his 
own hair.28   
This type of treatment was also reflected in confidential Bush administration memos 
written in 2002 that were released in 2004.  These memos were allegedly written for the 
CIA, who had been aggressively interrogating suspects since 9/11 and were concerned 
about potential prosecution for their actions.29   The first memo issued approval of a range 
of interrogation techniques, including changing normal sleep patterns, drastically changing 
the holding temperature and subjecting detainees to “sensory assault” with noise and lights.  
With proper permission, the detainees could be subject to psychological techniques 
designed to create “feelings of futility” and the use of female interrogators on male 
detainees.  Prisoners could also be made to stand for up to four hours at a time.  However, 
physical contact of any kind, waterboarding and the use of electricity were prohibited.  
Despite these limitations, the military acknowledged that two guards at Guantanamo Bay 
had already been disciplined for the use of excessive force against detainees.30  A second 
memo argued that torturing detainees “may be justified” and that international laws on the 
subject “may be unconstitutional if applied to interrogations.”  Any government employee 
who engaged in torture could argue for “necessity and self-defense” to eliminate 
subsequent criminal liability.31  The President was not bound by American or international 
laws on torture, and that if national security was at stake, government agents who tortured 
prisoners would be immune from prosecution on the President’s authority.32  Famously, an 
August 2002 memo written by Alberto Gonzales argued that:  
                                                     
28 Torture as Public Policy:  Restoring U.S. Credibility on the World State  (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 
2010), 1327-28. 
29 Robert M Pallitto, ed. Torture and State Violence in the United States: A Short Documentary History 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 752. 
30 Dana Priest and Joe Stephens, "Pentagon Approved Tougher Interrogations," The Washington Post, 9 May 
2004.  The exact permission that was needed for the psychological techniques is not stated in this article.  In a 
well-known story, Donald Rumsfeld, who uses a lectern as a desk, wrote a note in the brief that permitted 
forced standing for up to four hours that stated, “However, I stand for eight to ten hours a day.  Why is 
standing limited to four hours?”  See ABC, "World News Tonight with Peter Jennings," 22 June 2004.   
31 Dana Priest and R Jeffrey Smith, "Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture," The Washington Post, 8 
June 2004. 
32 David Rennie, "Ban on Torture Overruled in Pentagon," The Daily Telegraph, 8 June 2004.  
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Torture is not the mere infliction of pain or suffering on another, but is 
instead a step well removed.  The victim must experience intense pain or 
suffering of the kind that is equivalent to the pain that would be associated 
with serious physical injury so severe that death, organ failure, or 
permanent damage resulting in a loss of significant body function will likely 
result.  If the pain is psychological … these acts must cause long-term 
mental harm … In short, reading the definition of torture as a whole, it is 
plain that the term encompasses only extreme acts.33 
It also noted that only those who had “specific intent” to torture would be covered – those 
who might have strayed into the realm of torture through overzealous questioning would 
not be covered under the torture laws, despite the fact that federal law does not make this 
distinction.  This could be established by either a lack of intent to engage in torture through 
the reasonableness of the interrogator’s belief or through a good-faith effort to stay within 
the law.34  Another memo noted that because there were no long-term psychological 
consequences from particular techniques when the military used them against their own 
personnel in the SERE (survival, evasion, resistance, escape) training, these were also 
permissible to use on detainees, despite the fact that the SERE program does not expose 
soldiers to these techniques in the long term.  Additionally, because there had been 
consultation with psychologists and interrogation experts, the memo argued that these 
methods could be pursued in “the presence of a good faith belief that no prolonged mental 
harm” would come to the detainees.  Some later memos also argued that there could be no 
international legal consequences because the Convention Against Torture could not impose 
a different obligation on the United States than found in the torture statute, and ICC 
prosecution was not possible both because the United States had withdrawn its consent and 
because war crime prosecutions could only occur when the detainees are covered under the 
Geneva Conventions.35  Finally, even if an interrogation method did violate existing statue, it 
would be unconstitutional if it interfered with the President’s constitutional power to 
conduct a military campaign.  With this legal backdrop, the CIA used waterboarding at least 
                                                     
33 Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel, The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 183. 
34 Pallitto, Torture and State Violence, 752. 
35 Torture and State Violence, 753. 
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83 times in one month on Abu Zubaydah and 183 times on Khalid Shaikh Mohammed.  
Additionally, this legal interpretation, though dismissed by the Obama administration, was 
upheld in their declarations not to prosecute any agent who had acted in good faith in 
accordance with the memos.36   
In addition to the reports coming out of Afghanistan and the CIA, the conditions at 
Guantanamo Bay also generated some controversy.  An anonymous source described the 
techniques used in Guantanamo Bay since the fall of 2002 as “extremely aggressive” and 
“appalling,” based on a very narrow legal definition of what constitutes torture.37  The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was the only international organization 
that the United States allowed at Guantanamo up to this point, but it was not given a 
permanent presence on the base nor was it allowed to monitor interrogations.38  Despite 
these problems, conditions across the camps were dissimilar.  For instance, detainees held 
in certain facilities such as Camp Iguana had very few complaints about treatment.  A 14-
year-old released detainee was reported as saying, “Cuba was great! … I am lucky I went 
there, and now I miss it.”  Others at the same facility said that the United States military 
treated them very well.39  In addition, conditions sometimes changed over time for the 
better.  For instance, the ICRC noted that complaints of sexual taunting stopped during the 
course of 2004.40 
Abu Ghraib and CIA Black Sites 
In April 2004 the Abu Ghraib scandal shifted the focus temporarily from Guantanamo 
Bay, and resulted in an internal Army investigation finding 27 people to have committed 
offences.41  For the first time in history, four Navy Special Forces personnel were charged 
with abusing the Iraqi detainee who later died in Abu Ghraib; a practice that military officials 
                                                     
36 Torture and State Violence, 754. 
37 CBS, "CBS Morning News," 21 May 2004. 
38 Frank Griffiths, "Guantanamo Suicide Attempts Continue," Associated Press Worldstream, 19 February 2003. 
39 "Hell-Hole or Paradise?  Detention in Guantánamo," The Economist, 20 March 2004. 
40 Neil A Lewis, "Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantanamo," The New York Times, 30 November 2004.  
41 "For Abu Ghraib," ibid., 26 August.  
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noted was very unusual given that the offences were committed on the battlefield.42   The 
level of abuse was corroborated by an October 2003 ICRC report that stated that their 
representatives had witnessed prisoners being kept completely naked in empty concrete 
cells, having been told by the officer in charge of the interrogation that this practice was 
“part of the process.”  When a medical delegate examined them, he found that they were 
“presenting signs of concentration difficulties, memory problems, verbal expression 
difficulties, incoherent speech, acute anxiety reactions, abnormal behavior and suicidal 
tendencies,” all of which appeared to have been caused by the methods and duration of 
detention.43   
This treatment was not limited to Abu Ghraib.  An American army captain stationed 
at Camp Mercury near the Syrian border in Iraq, Ian Fishback, testified to Human Rights 
Watch that abuses occurred there both before and after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, 
including pouring chemicals on prisoner’s faces, shackling in stress positions, forced exercise 
leading to unconsciousness and stacking prisoners in pyramids.  He stated that commanders 
would tell army personnel that someone would be, for instance, the triggerman for an 
improvised explosive device, after which they would “...fuck them up.  Fuck them up bad … 
But you gotta understand, this was the norm.”  Another sergeant who remained anonymous 
testified that, “Everyone in camp knew if you wanted to work out your frustration you show 
up at the PUC [Persons Under Control] tent.  In a way it was sport. One day (another 
sergeant) shows up and tells a PUC to grab a pole. He told him to bend over and broke the 
guy’s leg with a mini-Louisville slugger, a metal bat. As long as no PUCs came up dead, it 
happened. We kept it to broken arms and legs.”44  Furthermore, the sergeant stated that 
“trends were accepted. Leadership failed to provide clear guidance so we just developed it. 
They wanted intel [intelligence].”  When Fishback consulted with a Judge Advocate General 
(JAG) about the abuse, the JAG told him that the Geneva Conventions are a grey areas but 
                                                     
42 Eric Schmitt, "4 Navy Commandos Are Charged in Abuse," ibid., 4 September.  See also  "Navy Charges 3 
Commandos with Beating Prisoners," The New York Times, 25 September 2004. 
43 Mark Danner, Torture and the Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror  (London: Granta Books, 
2004), 6-7. 
44 Andrew Sullivan, "How America Tiptoed into the Torture Chamber," Sunday Times, 2 October 2005.  
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that the abuse was within them.45  The New York Times similarly reported on a Special 
Operations forces” prison, off-limits to the ICRC, called the Black Room at Camp Nama in 
Baghdad.  Here detainees, under the guise of extracting information about Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, were subject to beatings with rifle butts, were yelled at and were used as targets 
for paintball.  Signs at the facility stated, “NO BLOOD, NO FOUL,” explained by a Defense 
Department official as, “If you don’t make them bleed, they can’t prosecute for it.”46   
There is some evidence that the government was aware of the problems associated 
with the abuse in Iraq.  The CIA station at Baghdad had sent a cable to headquarters on 3 
August 2003 stating that it had concerns of the aggressiveness of the techniques Special 
Operations Forces were using in interrogations.  Five days later the CIA issued a classified 
directive stating that no harsh interrogations were to take place and barred them from 
working at Camp Nama.  A year later an FBI agent sent an email about a detainee captured 
by Task Force 6-26, who were involved in capturing high-value targets, claiming that he had 
been tortured and had suspicious burn marks on his body.47   
At the same time that the Abu Ghraib scandal broke The New York Times reported 
that the CIA was using a secret set of harsh interrogation techniques, endorsed by both the 
Justice Department and the CIA, against high-level al-Qaeda operatives.  For Khalid Shaikh 
Mohammed, they noted that one of the techniques used was “water boarding.’  These 
methods were reportedly so harsh that the FBI told their agents to leave the room lest they 
permanently compromise themselves for future criminal cases.48  Faced with the recent 
leaks and scandals, in 2005 the Pentagon approved a new policy directive that tightened 
controls over interrogations, ensuring that interrogators were properly trained and enacting 
measures through which soldiers in the field could report abuses.  It specifically prohibited 
acts of physical or mental torture, the use of military dogs and the involvement of military 
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police in the interrogations.49  The 2005 Detainee Treatment Act additionally prohibited 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of any individual in the custody or control of the US 
government.50  However, The New York Times later reported that this update to the Army’s 
Field Manual removed references to Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions in the section 
dealing with the treatment and questioning of prisoners.51   
In another attempt to demonstrate reform, the Department of Justice reportedly 
asked the CIA to disclose the specific interrogation methods used on senior al-Qaeda 
operatives in an effort to dispel the idea that Department of Justice officials authorized 
methods that bordered on torture.52  A military report published the following year on the 
abuses at Guantanamo Bay stated that though there was no evidence of physical 
mistreatment, several prisoners were mistreated or humiliated in other ways, perhaps 
illegally.53  At the same time that it was taking action against the abuses, the Bush 
administration also increased pressure on its allies to prevent criticism.  A European 
diplomat was quoted in the same year as saying, “It’s very clear they want European 
governments to stop pushing on this. They were stuck on the defensive for weeks, but 
suddenly the line has toughened up incredibly.”54   
The next scandal involving allegations of torture by the United States occurred when 
the Washington Post stated that the CIA was hiding and interrogating the most important al 
Qaeda captives in Eastern Europe, a system that was reportedly kept secret from public 
officials and “nearly all members of Congress charged with overseeing the CIA’s covert 
actions.”  CIA interrogators at these sites were permitted to use “enhanced interrogation 
techniques” that were otherwise prohibited by law.  The article noted that under American 
law only the president could authorize such a covert action.  In total, the United States held 
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about 100 people across the secret bases.55  ABC News later reported that according to 
current and former officers, the CIA was quick to shut down the secret prisons in Poland and 
Romania after being discovered, moving 11 al-Qaeda suspects to secret jails in North 
Africa.56 
A week later, The New York Times published a classified 2004 CIA report that 
included a list of 10 interrogation techniques for high-value detainees, including 
waterboarding, that were secretly created in early 2002.  It also reported a deep unease 
with some of the techniques that were thought to violate the Convention Against Torture.  
Though the report did not say that techniques such as waterboarding constituted torture, 
they did constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment according to the convention.57  
The Daily Telegraph later reported that some CIA agents were taking out legal insurance 
policies that would cover detainee suits for torture and human rights abuses.  Normally 
agents would be covered under government programs, but the Telegraph reported that 
there was some fear that this assistance could be withdrawn in cases of serious 
wrongdoing.58   
The Bush Administration’s Response to the Scandals 
There were further attempts at the legal clarification of torture, such as in 2005 
when the Justice Department published a memo with a revised definition of torture, stating 
that torture, previously defined as acts which led to “organ failure, impairment of bodily 
function, or even death,” would now include acts that fell short of excruciating pain, 
including those that caused physical suffering or lasting mental anguish.59  In 2006, the 
Supreme Court’s Hamdan ruling rejected the structure of the Guantanamo Bay military 
commissions where evidence extracted through torture might have been admissible, and 
gave all detainees the protection of the Geneva Conventions, effectively outlawing 
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torture.60  This led the Bush administration to admit to the existence of then-secret CIA 
prisons.61  The subsequent legislative struggle over what constituted torture culminated in a 
compromise bill between the White House and Senate.62  Despite claims in August 2006 that 
the CIA detention centers had been shut down, the administration admitted that the sites 
reopened seven months later.63   
The administration spent the rest of its term augmenting and defending the CIA 
program.  This included diplomatic pressure, such as when CIA Director Michael Hayden was 
reported to have complained privately with European diplomats about their response to the 
American interrogations of terrorism suspects.  He argued that fewer than 100 people had 
been detained in CIA “black site” facilities since 2002, and, of those, fewer than half had 
been subjected to “alternative procedures” in their questioning.64  A former CIA 
interrogator, John Kiriakou, argued that these procedures were effective, noting that Abu 
Zubiada agreed to cooperate after being subjected to waterboarding, stating that “it was 
like flipping a switch.”65  Other CIA operatives claimed that Abu Zubiada was able to 
withstand waterboarding for much longer than other detainees, but that “a short time 
afterwards, in the next day or so, he told his interrogator that Allah had vist[ed] him in his 
cell during the night and told him to cooperate.”66  In February 2007 the ICRC delivered a 
secret conclusion to the Acting General Counsel of the CIA, stating that, “[T]he ill-treatment 
to which [the detainees] were subjected while held in the CIA program, either singly or in 
combination, constituted torture.  In addition, many other elements of the ill-treatment, 
either singly or in combination, constituted cruel inhuman or degrading treatment.”67  In 
July 2007 President Bush issued an executive order stating that detainees held by the CIA 
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would be covered by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, protecting them from 
torture or “humiliating and degrading” treatment, specifically avoiding “intentionally 
causing serious bodily injury” and “forcing the individual to perform sexual acts,” and for the 
CIA to adopt a separate and secret set of interrogation methods from those of the military.  
Privately, officials stated that waterboarding was now out of the question, but did not 
comment on sleep deprivation, stress positions or other methods used by the CIA in the 
past.68   
The administration also began to discuss the legal ramifications of the CIA program.  
Attorney General Michael Mukasey stated that he would not allow the Justice Department 
to investigate whether the CIA interrogators broke torture laws through waterboarding 
because the Justice Department had issued secret memos stating that the President’s 
wartime powers made it legally permissible.  He noted that if they investigated officials who 
took action on the basis of the memos, then others would stop trusting the legal opinions of 
the department.69  The Justice Department subsequently announced that its internal ethics 
office was investigating its legal approval of waterboarding.70  The counsel for the Office of 
Professional Responsibility stated that, “Among other issues, we are examining whether the 
legal advice contained in those memoranda was consistent with the professional standards 
that apply to Department of Justice attorneys.”71  A letter sent on 5 March 2008 from the 
Justice Department to Congress stated that despite the executive order that made CIA 
comply with international treaties against the harsh treatment of detainees, “the fact that 
an act is undertaken to prevent a threatened terrorist attack, rather than for the purpose of 
humiliation or abuse, would be relevant to a reasonable observer in measuring the 
outrageousness of the act.”  An anonymous official responded that, “I certainly don’t want 
to suggest that if there’s a good purpose you can head off and humiliate and degrade 
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someone … [but] there are certainly things that can be insulting that would not raise to the 
level of an outrage on personal dignity.”72   
This summary of the allegations and internal discourse on the treatment of 
detainees lends credibility that there was both an attempt to utilize interrogation 
techniques that could constitute torture and create a legal backdrop through which this 
would be possible.  It shows that there were some serious problems with detainee abuse, 
particularly in the military and the CIA, which led to domestic legal reform in an attempt to 
prevent similar future conduct.  However, the executive continuously resisted any 
restrictions on their ability to use particular interrogation techniques that might constitute 
torture by arguing that there could be some emergency circumstances under which it would 
be permissible.  In other words, Congress tightened the restrictions over what the CIA and 
other government agencies could do normally in interrogations, but the Bush administration 
did not support the non-derogable character of torture, claiming alternatively that they 
should be able to use special techniques in a state of emergency.  There is also some 
evidence that the United States put pressure on its allies to prevent them from speaking out 
against the abuses.  Finally, it shows that despite its legal norm revisionism, there were still 
real concerns within the Bush administration that the actions taken could lead to 
prosecutions, at least domestically.   
United States 
Denial, Mitigation and Secrecy 
The United States used two primary means to avoid or reduce the discussion of 
mistreatment allegations.  The first strategy, utilized between 2002 and 2004, was to deny 
reports of mistreatment on the basis that there were factual errors in the statements by the 
media or other members of international society.73  For example, Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld commented on allegations of abuse at Guantanamo Bay in early 2002, 
asserting, “the numerous articles, statements, questions, allegations, and breathless reports 
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on television are undoubtedly by people who are either uninformed, misinformed, or poorly 
informed.”74  Claims of misinformation were also used between 2004 and 2006 when 
responding to specific reports by international organizations concerning the detainee abuse, 
at times adding that the allegations made by international organizations were not only false, 
but also politically motivated.75  The second means to avoid or reduce the discussion of 
mistreatment allegations was to appeal to the need for secrecy.  When reasons were given 
for the secrecy, they revolved around the argument that sharing such information could aid 
future terrorists in developing ways to combat the interrogation techniques.76 
In general, discourses that involve only denial or appeals to secrecy occur because a 
state wants to avoid legitimation contestation from other members of international society 
for conduct that it suspects might be illegitimate.  However, this does not necessarily 
absolve the state from the costs of illegitimacy.  If these types of discourses occur at a time 
when the alleged conduct is widely viewed to be illegitimate, they will not necessarily help 
to prevent the state from the costs associated with the illegitimate acts as other actors in 
international society can still engage in legitimation discourses that place costs on the 
offending state.  At best, they can only allow the state to avoid engaging in a legitimation 
discourse that might be even less successful in terms of avoiding costs and maintaining its 
legitimacy.  However, if other states accept that US actions are not worth discussing openly, 
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this strategy might be successful in alleviating short terms costs, and would also point to a 
relative weakness in the particular international human rights norms.77  This does not 
necessarily lead to an optimal long-term outcome for the Bush administration; however, as 
Ian Hurd argued that any type of secrecy is a high risk strategy to pursue because there are 
negative consequences associated with the exposure of illegitimate behavior.78  The other 
possibility explaining the presence of the discourse is that the state feels that it is in such a 
strong position, either ideationally or materially, that it can ignore other actors, refuse to 
engage in practices of legitimation, and absorb the costs of what others view as illegitimate 
actions.79 
Moral Legitimation 
The moral legitimation strategy of the United States occurred via four major types of 
discourses.  The first set of legitimating discourses focused on entrenching the idea of a 
state of exception, either through appeals to the special nature of terrorism itself or the 
detainees in particular.  This was complimented with an argument that the state had a duty 
to protect its citizens under such conditions.  The second discourse involved an argument 
that the United States did not engage in torture either because torture was abhorrent, that 
the treatment of the detainees was respectful, or that claims by detainees that contradicted 
these statements were dubious.  Third, the United States promoted the idea that torture 
was a contested idea and suggested that particular methods that the government engaged 
in were not torture.  Lastly, it appealed either to the character of the state or the character 
of the interrogators, either arguing that it is not within the US character to engage in 
torture, or that the interrogators were professionals with proper procedures in place so acts 
of torture are unlikely.   
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State of Exception 
The first moral legitimation strategy used by the Bush administration was to argue that 
there existed exceptional circumstances brought on by the threat of terrorism.  As the state 
has a duty to protect its citizens, this justified the differential treatment of the detainees – 
treatment that was effective in combating this special threat.  This type of argument could 
be problematic for the Bush administration because torture is defined under international 
law as a right to which there can be no derogations under any circumstances.80  To counter 
this problem, the Bush administration never directly linked the argument of exceptional 
circumstances to specific changes in the treatment of the detainees.  Instead, it referred 
generally to exceptional circumstances in discussions on detainee treatment, usually in light 
of the potential for a future terrorist attack.  This legitimation strategy allowed the Bush 
administration to suggest that there were extraordinary circumstances that might permit 
treatment that would otherwise be unacceptable without making statements that would be 
in conflict with its treaty obligations.   
This legitimation strategy involved the use of contradictions between the prevailing 
norms against torture and the need to provide physical security for US citizens, in the hopes 
that the Bush administration could legitimate actions that fell within the penumbra of the 
accepted definition of torture.  In Skinnerian terms, this is an attempt to associate a 
negatively held evaluative-descriptive term, torture, with a positively held one, security, in 
order to offset the negative reaction to the former.  Notably it is this particular 
contradiction, as David Luban argued, that allows torture to be legitimated in a liberal 
democracy.  Instead of portraying torture as the application of cruel agency, torture is 
committed by those who find themselves in circumstances where it is a necessary evil that 
they otherwise would not commit.  As such, the Bush administration argued that there were 
exceptional circumstances that could be alleviated by state action through intelligence-
gathering methods that were effective.  Stressing the exceptional circumstances and 
particularly the effectiveness of intelligence-gathering methods, one of the most frequent 
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moral discourses employed by the Bush administration, made it more likely that the 
discourse would be accepted in a liberal democracy under Luban’s framework. 
However, the clear limitations faced by the United States that prevented it from 
directly applying the idea of exceptional circumstances to differential detainee conduct also 
demonstrates the legitimacy of the torture norm being non-derogable.  As Schimmelfennig 
noted, when actors are faced with the external constraints of legitimate norms, they are 
forced to argue their case through the pre-existing legitimate standards.  This lack of direct 
appeal means that the non-derogable nature of the torture norm under exceptional 
circumstances is likely one that the United States was aware of, and felt constrained 
sufficiently by, so that it would prefer to sidestep the issue rather than directly confront the 
norm.   
The administration justified exceptional measures both through on appeal to the risk 
of future terrorist threats and the differing and exceptional nature of the detainees.  In an 
example of the former, Vice President Dick Cheney alluded to the possibility of non-
standard interrogation methods days after 9/11.  He argued that, in addition to using 
military force against al-Qaeda,  
We also have to work, though, sort of the dark side, if you will.  We”ve got 
to spend time in the shadows in the intelligence world.  A lot of what 
needs to be done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, 
using sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies, 
if we’re going to be successful.81   
Cofer Black, the head of the CIA Counterterrorist Center, likewise stated in September 2002 
that there was “operational flexibility” in dealing with detainees, noting that, “there was 
before 9/11, and there was an after 9/11 ... After 9/11 the gloves come off.”82  In 2004, 
military spokespersons appealed to the condition of war to legitimate alternative 
interrogation tactics.83  Speaking to reporters en route to Berlin in 2005, Secretary of State 
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Condoleezza Rice similarly asserted that the war on terrorism “is frankly challenging our 
norms and our practices.”84  The exceptional circumstances discourse appeared more 
frequently in 2005 and 2006, primarily through administration officials reminding their 
audiences of the special dangers inherent in the terrorist threat,85 but declined near the end 
of the administration, occurring only a handful of times in 2007 and 2008.86  Notably, the 
White House spokesperson stated in 2008 that the President could authorize further 
waterboarding on terrorist suspects under certain circumstances, particularly if they were to 
believe that an attack may be imminent.87   
In addition to speaking to the general danger of terrorism, the administration also 
reinforced the exceptionalist discourse by making claims that the detainees were unusual or 
extraordinary themselves.  General Richard B. Myers was quoted as saying that the 
detainees were so dangerous that if not properly bound during transport “they would gnaw 
through the hydraulic cables”88 on their transport plane to make it crash.  From time to time 
this moral aspect of the claim would be more explicit, such as when Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Eric Ruff stated that, “We face an enemy who has no standards, respects no laws, 
and whose destructive intent has no limits.”89  The discourse that the detainees were 
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‘dangerous’ or were ‘bad people’ in some way was a very common legitimation tactic for 
members of the Bush administration, particularly in 2005 and 2006.90   
The discourse that the state had an overriding duty to protect its citizens only 
occurred between 2005 and 2006.  It is possible that this was added to the Bush 
administration’s legitimation discourses because of the pressure from the torture scandals 
the Bush administration felt that it needed to make the protective role of the government 
over its people explicit to legitimate its actions.  In effect, it used another contradiction 
between norms to emphasize the positive role that the state provides for its citizens in 
contrast to the negative conduct of torture.  Again, at no point did an administration official 
directly tie together the duty of the state to differential interrogation techniques.  Instead, 
these arguments only occurred while discussing these interrogation techniques.  This only 
reinforced the claim that there was a pre-existing norm that prevented the Bush 
administration from explicitly tying together the protective role of the state with potentially 
torturous interrogation methods.  In one example, the executive stated that proposed 
legislation to limit interrogation methods would usurp the president’s authority and, 
according to a White House official, interfere with the President’s ability “to protect 
Americans effectively from terrorist attack.”91  The administration would sometimes direct 
this discourse at other states.  Condoleezza Rice used this argument during a visit to Europe 
in an attempt to reassure the European allies, reminding them that, “we are all working 
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together through law enforcement cooperation, intelligence cooperation, to try and 
produce the very best outcome to protect innocent citizens.”92  She emphasized the unique 
nature of the situation in later statements during this trip, reminding others that the state 
has a duty to protect its citizens in the face of this unique danger.93  The Bush administration 
also used this discourse after the press disclosed the existence of the CIA black sites.94  
Moreover, the administration appealed to needing the proper tools with which to conduct 
the war on terror a few times late in its tenure.  In an interview with Matt Lauer, President 
Bush responded to a question concerning whether the administration had gone too far in 
interrogating terror suspects, stating that, “You can’t expect me, and people in this 
government, to do what we need to do to protect you and your family if we don’t have the 
tools that we think are necessary to do so.”95  A government spokesperson similarly stated 
of a bill that would limit the interrogation capabilities of the CIA that it, “would take away 
one of the most valuable tools on the war on terror: the CIA program to detain and question 
key terrorist leaders and operatives.”96 
Having argued that there existed exceptional circumstances and that the state has 
the primary duty to protect its citizens, the Bush administration contended throughout its 
entire term that the successful interrogation of detainees was important to alleviating the 
security risk, again attempting to associate US interrogation techniques with security.  The 
sheer volume of these statements reflects Luban’s book that liberal democracies can only 
engage in torture as an act to prevent future evils and not as punishment or terror that 
would be antithetical to the liberal project.  Even as early as 2002 Rumsfeld responded to an 
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accusation of the torture of Abu Zubaydah by arguing that: “We are very anxious to gather 
as much intelligence as we can. We’ve been working hard on it and we intend to continue 
it.”97  Two days later he did admit during questioning from reporters that, “the overriding 
importance -- important issue is intelligence gathering” and that “and we intend to get 
every single thing out of him to try to prevent terrorist acts in the future.”98  Between 2005 
and 2006 many administration members used this discourse, particularly President Bush.99    
Once the media publicized the methods of interrogation, the Bush administration 
began to emphasize that the interrogations were working to produce actionable 
intelligence.  They claimed that after almost 100 sessions with both the CIA and FBI, the 
interrogation of Abu Zubaydah had resulted in information that allowed the administration 
to pre-empt a new wave of attacks and arrest an American citizen accused of plotting to 
detonate a radioactive device in the United States.  In addition, they claimed that Abu 
Zubaydah provided information about the identity of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, one of the 
central planners of the 9/11 attacks.100  The administration made widespread claims 
concerning the usefulness of the information gathered from the interrogations of 
detainees,101 when defending the CIA secret prisons,102 when opposing legislation that 
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might limit the CIA interrogation program,103 to justify waterboarding,104 or defending the 
interrogation program more generally.105     
Torture is Abhorrent and Not Conducted 
The second major discourse of the Bush administration was that torture is abhorrent, that it 
was not conducted by the administration, and, where it did occur, the government brought 
the perpetrators to justice.  The discourse concerning the morally repulsive and 
unproductive nature of torture attempted to separate the interrogations techniques of the 
administration from torture.  It also suggested that by upholding the moral norm against 
torture that the United States was not as much challenging the torture norm as it was 
attempting to revise the definition of torture.  In other words, there was a difference 
between special interrogation techniques used which were both apt for the situation and 
effective, and torture, which was morally unjustified.  However, there were far fewer 
statements concerning the lack of utility for torture versus its moral repulsiveness, which 
might indicate given the large discourse over the positive utility of the interrogation 
techniques that there was some belief within the administration that interrogation 
techniques that pushed the boundaries of what was considered torture were useful. The 
legitimation strategy that declared the treatment of the detainees to be respectful serves, in 
parallel with the discourse that torture is abhorrent, as a discourse that legitimated the 
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norm against torture but underpinned the Bush administration’s desire to use its alternative 
interrogation techniques, which were still respectful, though possibly harsher than normal.     
The claim that the administration did not torture is one of the more difficult 
discourses to classify, as it could mean two things.  First, it could indicate that the United 
States did not torture as defined by international standards, in which case it was a denial 
discourse that operated to avoid the costs associated with potentially illegitimate activity in 
conjunction with secrecy and claims of misinformation.  Second, it could mean that the 
United States did not torture according to its own standards, standards that were different 
from those of international society, and it was attempting implicitly to legitimate these 
domestic standards.  If this was the case, then the discourse was a legitimation strategy that 
attempted to normalize particular behavior that would otherwise be unacceptable.  
However, as there was relatively full knowledge of the techniques used in the Bush 
administration’s interrogation program when this discourse was prevalent, it points towards 
the latter interpretation that the United States was not torturing according to its own 
standards. 
The United States also acknowledged that abuse had occurred, but claimed that 
these were isolated mistakes that, first, did not represent the status quo and, second, were 
followed either by changes in policy or additional monitoring by independent agencies.  This 
helps to reinforce a number of issues.  First, it appeals to Luban’s claim that torture in a 
liberal democracy can only be for the purposes of intelligence gathering, so when 
government operatives step beyond this, it is important to demonstrate that there are 
corrective mechanisms.  Second, it helps to play into the previous discourses stressing that 
there is professionalism among the interrogators and that the United States is a liberal 
democracy with a particular character that abhors torture.  Third, the argument that the 
abuse was not systematic, but was only perpetrated by lower-level agents, helps to protect 
the executive from issues of command responsibility. 
The first discourse by the Bush administration was that the treatment of the 
detainees was respectful without any reference to a particular law or treaty.  This discourse 
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was particularly prevalent when information came out that suggested that the United States 
was abusing prisoners in both in 2002 and in the period from 2004 to 2006.106  
Administration officials often nuanced this discourse with the idea that detainee treatment 
would not necessarily be ideal given their previously legitimated status as dangerous, but 
would at least meet particular standards.107  Administration officials also tied the need for 
respectful treatment with the utilitarian value of this treatment in yielding intelligence.  For 
instance, a military spokesperson stated that respectful treatment was strategic because 
“the more comfortable that the detainees are, we’re hoping that they’re going to be more 
forthcoming with information.”108  The Bush administration reiterated this claim in 2005 and 
2006 when an Army psychologist described the accoutrements in the interrogation room at 
Guantanamo Bay, including a faux Persian carpet, a coffee pot, a mini-fridge and a La-Z-Boy 
recliner.109 Another official argued that, “the most common method used to interrogate 
detainees is to sit down with them, watch a movie and eat pizza … You build up a 
relationship with them and eventually they co-operate.”110   In 2006 and 2007, 
administration officials simply claimed, for the first time, that the United States does not 
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torture.111  This switch in discourses from the respectfulness of treatment to the outright 
denial of torture might indicate that sufficient pressure had been placed on the Bush 
administration that caused it to directly confront allegations that it tortured instead of 
making claims about respectful treatment.   
The discourse that torture was morally repulsive was prevalent particularly after the 
Abu Ghraib scandal.112  In general, from 2003 to 2006 the Bush administration declared that 
torture was immoral or that it did not tolerate its use.113  For instance, in a report to the 
United Nations Committee Against Torture, the United States government stated that “the 
United States is unequivocally opposed to the use and practice of torture … [and that] no 
circumstance whatsoever, including war, the threat of war, [or] internal political stability” 
can justify its use.114  However, the Bush administration’s claims that torture is ineffective 
were somewhat sparser.115  For instance, John Ashcroft stated in front of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee that despite the 100-page memo that, “I condemn torture. I don’t think 
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it’s productive, let alone justified.”116  John Negroponte similarly stated at his confirmation 
hearing before the US Senate that the CIA and other agencies would be in “full compliance” 
with laws that ban torture as torture is not “an effective way of producing useful 
information.”117  
The Bush administration additionally argued that although particular abuses had 
occurred, it had brought the perpetrators of those abuses to justice.  This occurred even 
before the Abu Ghraib scandal, when the US military charged six soldiers with indecency 
and assault over transgressions at the Abu Ghraib prison.  Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt 
stated that “less [sic] than 20” prisoners were abused, and that “Even though it was a very 
small number, that’s the kind of cancer you have to cut out completely.”118  He continued 
that, “the coalition takes all reports of detainee abuse seriously, and all allegations of 
mistreatment are investigated.”119  This idea that those who committed abuse would be 
brought to justice was particularly prevalent after the Abu Ghraib scandal.120  After the trials 
of these suspected personnel, the discourse transformed to focus on the claim that the Bush 
administration had brought those responsible to justice.121 The United States rarely 
addressed the systemic nature of the abuse.  President Bush made statements that 
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portrayed the acts of abuse as the responsibility of one of a few bad apples, arguing how the 
abuse showed, “how much difference, for good or ill, the choices of individual men and 
women can make ... The cruelty of a few has brought discredit to their uniform and 
embarrassment to our country.”122  At other times, the administration explicitly stated that 
the abuse was not systemic.123   
The last discourse was to question the moral character of the detainees.  This 
involved claiming that they always lied in the hopes of diminishing the legitimacy of any 
statements that the Bush administration might make with regard to their mistreatment.  In 
a 2001 Senate Judiciary Committee meeting, John Ashcroft displayed what he called a 
“seized al Qaeda training manual,” that he described as a “how-to” instruction manual for 
terrorists that instructed them to, “exploit our judicial process for the success of their 
operations … to concoct stories of torture and mistreatment at the hands of our officials.”124  
This legitimation strategy was continued almost two weeks later by Paul Wolfowitz at a 
press conference.  When asked by a reporter about the interrogation plans for 18 prisoners 
in US custody, he stated that “it’s a complicated business … [because] these guys are very 
skilled liars. They lie shamelessly; when you catch them out in a lie, they go on to another 
lie.”125  This discourse reappeared over the debate concerning detainee suicides in 2003,126 
when countering allegations of ill-treatment while attempting to force-feed detainees on 
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hunger strike in 2006,127 and to defend the allegations of mistreatment by Omar Kadr in the 
same year.128   
Contesting and Defining Torture 
In addition to arguing that there was a state of emergency that required special detainee 
treatment, but arguing that torture was reprehensible and not conducted, the Bush 
administration also attempted to define what it meant by torture.  First it argued that 
torture was a fundamentally contested concept, by focusing on the fact that there is no 
commonly accepted definition of torture.  This further played on the doubt that there are 
circumstances in which one might feel morally squeamish about particular action, but where 
structural constraints might force one’s hand.  At the same time, administration officials 
gave examples of acts that they would not regard as torture, sometimes being quite specific.  
Legally, this was an important distinction because there are interrogation techniques that 
may be particularly cruel or unusual, but would not rise to the level of torture and therefore 
have fewer legal ramifications.  This legitimation strategy also set up potential contestation 
between the United States and other actors in international society since it put forward 
contestable claims regarding what actions constituted torture.  It also demonstrates that 
there was less confidence about the nature of waterboarding, as no administration official 
directly came out and stated that waterboarding was not torture.  Instead, they would imply 
that waterboarding was not torture or argue that they personally thought it was torture, but 
that they could not comment on its legal status. 
Some administration officials set an exceptionally high bar as to what constituted 
torture when asked to define it.  Paul Rester of the Joint Interrogation Group stated in 2006 
that it was, “the deliberate and sadistic of [sic] mental or physical pain on another human 
being. It’s as simple as that. For the pure and simple satisfaction of doing it. It serves no 
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redeeming social value in eliciting concrete information.”129  National Intelligence Director 
Mike McConnell defined torture in 2007 as “mutilation or murder or rape or physical pain, 
those kinds of things.”130  Administration officials would also appeal to relativism in their 
definition of torture.  In 2005, the Director of the CIA, Porter Goss, defined torture, “in 
terms of inflicting pain or something like that, physical pain or causing a disability, those 
kinds of things that probably would be a common definition for most Americans, sort of you 
know it when you see it.”131  Attorney General Alberto Gonzales similarly stated at a 
meeting that, “If we went around this room, people would have different definitions of 
what constitutes torture, depending on the circumstances.”132  On the subject of 
waterboarding however, some administration officials claimed that it was torture to them, 
but would not make claims of legality beyond their personal feelings on the matter.133   
The Bush administration also argued that particular interrogation techniques did not 
constitute torture.  Between 2003 and 2005 administration officials claimed that acceptable 
interrogation techniques consisted of temporary deprivations of sleep, light, food, water 
and medical attention, covering detainees in black hoods, having them stand or kneel in 
uncomfortable positions, subjecting them to extremes of hot or cold or using detainee’s 
children as leverage;134 interrogating them for 20 hours a day for two months, telling them 
that they were gay, forcing them to dance with a man, forcing them to wear a bra and 
forcing them to wear a leash and perform dog tricks;135 and any of the 24 interrogation 
procedures permitted at Guantanamo, including placing detainees in uncomfortable cells or 
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pretending that they had been flown to a Middle Eastern state for interrogation.136  They 
also claimed that the interrogation techniques used were not torture without disclosing 
what the techniques actually were.  Donald Rumsfeld, when asked in 2004 whether the 
American troops tortured detainees, stated that, “I’m not a lawyer. My impression is that 
what has been charged thus far is abuse, which I believe technically is different from torture 
…  I don’t know if the -- it is correct to say what you just said, that torture has taken place, or 
that there’s been a conviction for torture. And therefore I’m not going to address the 
torture word.”137  Various spokespersons in the intelligence community made similar 
statements.138  Sometimes this argument relied on the legitimacy of domestic legal 
decisions, such as in an interview with Bill O’Reilly where George Tenet argued that the 
techniques used by his officers were legal because, “We know that the attorney general of 
the United States told us it was not torture.”139   
Later, the Bush administration implicitly argued that waterboarding was not torture.  
In 2006 Vice President Cheney was asked on a radio show whether “a dunk water [sic] is a 
no-brainer if it can save lives?”  He responded that, “Well, it’s a no brainier for me, but I -- 
for a while there I was criticized as being the vice president for torture. We don’t torture. 
That’s not what we’re involved in.”140  This characterization of waterboarding as an obvious 
tactic given the circumstances, followed by a claim that the United States does not torture, 
suggests that waterboarding itself would not be classified as torture.  In 2008, when 
President Bush was asked about waterboarding, he correspondingly replied that, “we, 
within the law, interrogate and get information,”141 suggesting again that waterboarding 
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might be “within the law” without explicitly saying so.  Similarly, when asked about 
waterboarding two days later, Stephen Bradbury, a senior official in the Office of Legal 
Council replied that the permitted interrogation tactics were “quite distressing, 
uncomfortable, even frightening,” so long as they did not cause enough severe and lasting 
pain to constitute torture.142  Thus, so long as waterboarding did not meet the threshold of 
both severity and duration outlined by the Justice Department, it could not be said to 
constitute torture. 
Torture is not in Our Character 
The last major moral discourse of the Bush administration was to argue that torture could 
not take place in the United States because of the character of the state or the interrogators 
themselves.  Arguing that it is not in the character of the state to use torture attempts to 
leverage the legitimacy of the United States, perhaps specifically its democratic nature, in 
order to assuage international criticism.  It can be a difficult discourse to implement, 
because by explicitly focusing on the legitimacy of the state or its institutions, one 
potentially opens the structures themselves up for criticism.  Appealing to the character of 
the interrogators themselves is an argument related to the professionalism of the 
interrogators.  This echoes Luban’s claim that torture cannot occur in liberal democracies if 
linked to cruelty.  Instead, by appealing to proper procedure, tools to achieve a goal, and 
given the professionalism of the interrogators, the program was acting with restraint in a 
manner consistent with liberal values, only applying enough pressure to the detainees as 
was needed to prevent future terrorist attacks.  The Bush administration officials further 
consolidated this discourse through their claims that interrogators should receive immunity 
from prosecution, as those interrogating detainees were not sadists, but only state agents 
attempting to prevent terrorism.   
Concerning the legitimation strategy that torture is not part of the American 
character, President Bush stated as early as 2003, “No, of course not - we don’t torture 
people in America, and people who make that claim just don’t know anything about our 
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country.”143  Similarly, after the Abu Ghraib scandal, President Bush responded to the 
pictures of prisoner abuse in Abu Ghraib by stating, “I share a deep disgust that those 
prisoners were treated the way they were treated.  Their treatment does not reflect the 
nature of the American people.”144  Other administration officials followed up between 
2004 and 2006 by emphasizing either that Americans do not torture others and that there 
would be no cover-up of torture in a democratic system unlike in other more dictatorial 
states,145 that torture was not an American value,146 that the United States was a leader in 
human rights,147 or that the structures of liberal democratic society would bring 
perpetrators to justice.148  The United States attempted to demonstrate its character by 
reminding the audience of the relative openness of the state and the media.  Other actors in 
international society, particularly the ICRC, were monitoring the United States” conduct.  
This legitimation discourse was prevalent after various scandals over the torture of 
detainees.149  The United States Department of State also invited three UN experts to visit 
Guantanamo Bay to ensure that the detainees were treated properly,150 the officer in 
charge of media relations at Guantanamo Bay later mentioning that, “we keep inviting 
people down, even the people from organizations that say we torture.”151   
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An example of the discourse stressing proper procedures occurred when a Pentagon 
spokesperson explained in 2004 that, “the high-level approval is done with forethought by 
people in responsibility, and layers removed from the people actually doing these things, so 
you can have an objective approach.”152  Similarly, after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, a 
spokesperson for the American military denied the claims that mistreatment at 
Guantanamo Bay was equal to that at Abu Ghraib, stating that, “From the beginning we 
have taken extra steps to treat prisoners not only humanely but extra cautiously.”153  
Several administration officials used this legitimation strategy between 2004 and 2008.154  
Even waterboarding was defended with this discourse, the administration arguing that it 
was subject to “strict time limits, safeguards, [and] restrictions,” and that water had not 
entered the lungs of the three prisoners subjected to the practice. 155  
The last discourse in this category was to appeal to the professionalism of the 
interrogators.  For instance, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley defended the 
program in an interview with George Stephanopoulos, stating, “this is not a program out of 
control. This is a program that is conducted pursuant to law by professionals who receive a 
lot of training.”156  Similarly, between 2005 and 2008, other members of the administration 
appealed to the professionalism of the interrogators.157   
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Legal Legitimation 
Norm Entrepreneurship 
In order to understand the legal norm entrepreneurship that the Bush administration 
engaged in, it is necessary to place it within the context of the previous moral 
argumentation.  The moral legitimation strategies that stressed the state of exception due 
to the dangers of terrorism, the duty of the state to protect its citizens and the importance 
of intelligence gathering provide the backdrop to the Bush administration’s legal challenges 
during its tenure, both in terms of international human rights and humanitarian law.  The 
United States attempted to act as a norm entrepreneur through both international 
humanitarian law, where they claimed that the detainees should receive differential 
treatment, and in international human rights law, where it challenged the geographical 
scope of applicability of the Convention Against Torture and passed legislation that gave the 
powers of defining torture to the executive.  However, there are very few statements of 
either type, and no legal legitimation occurred past 2006, suggesting that the United States 
believed it had been unsuccessful in its attempts to innovate and had given up.  This idea is 
reinforced by a subsequent revival of legitimation via domestic legal sources from 2006 to 
the end of the Bush administration’s term.   
Within international humanitarian law, the administration attempted to justify 
differential treatment for the detainees of the war on terror through an appeal to the 
notion that they were not prisoners of war, but instead ‘enemy combatants’ who had fewer 
rights.  This legal legitimation strategy correlates with the moral legitimation strategy that 
the detainees were morally suspect and to be treated respectfully in light of their position as 
particularly heinous individuals who could commit future crimes.  In response to the initial 
Guantanamo pictures, Donald Rumsfeld insinuated that the detainees were not classified as 
Prisoners of War, stating that they were only, “for the most part” being treated “in a 
manner that is reasonably consistent with the Geneva Convention.”158  This was built upon 
by Secretary of State Colin Powell, who added that, “A certain set of criteria were applied to 
the terrorists at Guantanamo, that they were illegal noncombatants, and a different set of 
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criteria were applied to the people that came into our custody in Iraq. That was clearly 
during [a] normal conventional war and they would be treated fully within the Geneva 
Convention.”159  However, this appeal to norm change in international humanitarian law 
was limited in scope, and after 2006 there were no further attempts to legitimate a 
reclassification of the detainees in the administration’s discourse concerning their proper 
treatment.160   
A longer-lasting but equally sparse legal discourse that attempted to innovate 
through the medium of international human rights law dealt with the interpretation of the 
Convention Against Torture.  Here the administration attempted to argue that there were 
geographical limits to the applicability of the convention that rendered it inapplicable to 
those held in Guantanamo Bay.  In a March 2003 memo entitled “Working Group Report on 
Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism,” lawyers assessed the rules for 
interrogations at Guantanamo Bay, stating that while the United States ratified the 
Convention Against Torture, it did so with “a variety of reservations and understandings” 
and that “the United States has maintained consistently that the covenant does not apply 
outside the United States or its special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, and that it does 
not apply to operations of the military during an international armed conflict.”161  Similarly, 
in his confirmation as Attorney General, Alberto Gonzales stated that nonmilitary personnel 
such as CIA agents fell outside the 2002 directive on the humane treatment of prisoners 
issued by President Bush, and that the Congressional ban on cruel, unusual and inhuman 
treatment of prisoners did not extend to all cases of aliens overseas.162   
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Treatment in Accordance with the Law 
At the same time that the United States was attempting to innovate within international 
law, it also used legitimation strategies where it claimed that it was acting within the law, 
both international and domestic.  However, like previous legitimation strategies where it 
denied that torture was taking place, this was potentially norm entrepreneurial depending 
on whether the United States intended to make the statements to deny the actions that it 
was taking, or to indicate that it considered that the publicly known interrogation methods 
were in accordance with international law.  This legitimation strategy took two general 
forms.  The first was to use the idea of lawfulness without engaging in legal argumentation 
itself.  The second was to engage actively in direct appeals to international or domestic law.   
The general discourse of lawfulness without engaging in legal reasoning occurred 
throughout the administration.163  The use of this discourse might have indicated an 
unwillingness to engage directly in legal debates over the treatment of the detainees, as 
there was no specificity to what law it was engaging with, while still attempting to give the 
impression that the techniques were legal.  For instance, as part of his confirmation as 
attorney general, Alberto Gonzales stated that “there was a desire to explore certain 
methods of questioning these terrorists,” though “there was concern that nothing be done 
that would violate the law.”164  At times, ‘international law’ was referenced without any clue 
as to what particular aspect was being discussed,165 such as when General Richard Meyers 
noted that “torture is not one of the methods that we’re allowed to use and that we use.  I 
mean, it’s just not permitted by international law. And we don’t use it.”166  This type of claim 
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was more specific than appealing to the law in general, since it demonstrated an assertion 
that the methods used to interrogate the detainees fell specifically within international 
norms.  Again though, because of the lack of specificity, it is difficult to know whether this 
was the intention, or whether they were used in the same manner as the discourses 
appealing to generalized ‘law.’  This problem also exists with rather frequent statements 
that covered a gambit of laws, mentioning both international and domestic sources.167  This 
discourse was less abstract than the previous legitimation strategy of appealing to ‘the law’ 
in general, and can be interpreted more as a direct claim to legality.  However, in its 
generality it could also be understood as a means to make a discursive appeal to the law 
without engaging in the legality of the treatment of the detainees.  In a typical example, 
John Ashcroft stated in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee that the administration, 
“has operated with respect to all of the laws enacted by the Congress, all of the treaties 
embraced by the president and the Congress together, and the Constitution of the United 
States, and no direction or order has been given to violate any of those laws.”168   
The second set of legal discourses directly appealed to specific international or 
domestic laws.  These were almost certainly claims that the treatment of the detainees was 
legal, but were relatively rare compared to the legal discourses that did not appeal to 
specific laws.  Some discourses explicitly cited international humanitarian law.  Donald 
Rumsfeld responded to an accusation of the torture of Abu Zubaydah by reiterating that the 
United States was not torturing them: “We’re treating these people under the Geneva 
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Convention and in a humane way.”169  This appeal to international humanitarian law was 
particularly prevalent among military spokespersons in 2003 and 2004,170  but other 
administration officials occasionally used the discourse up to 2006.171  Other references 
were explicit in mentioning international human rights law.  For instance, the State 
Department issued a statement on the International Day in Support of the Victims of 
Torture in 2002 that, “freedom from torture is an inalienable human right, and the 
prohibition of torture is a basic principle of international human rights law. This prohibition 
is absolute and allows no exception ... The United States is committed to the world-wide 
elimination of torture.”172  Some administration statements in 2005 and 2006 specifically 
mentioned treaties such as the Convention Against Torture, but again these were relatively 
rare.173   
Finally, the Bush administration would appeal solely to its own domestic law in 
responding to claims of torture or mistreatment. This had a bimodal distribution, appearing 
just after 9/11 and just before the end of the Bush administration’s second term.  This 
distribution, particularly in light of how appealing to international sources of law 
disappeared at the end of Bush’s second term, seems to demonstrate that the 
administration had given up on appealing to international law and was placing increasing 
emphasis on domestic sources of legal legitimacy.  For instance, when the United States 
                                                     
169 U.S. Department of Defense, DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), (01 April 2002), 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3384. 
170 See for instance "Rights Groups Worried About Torture of Afghan Detainees at Guantanamo Bay," Agence 
France Presse, 14 February 2003; Patrick Tyler, "Ex-Guantanamo Detainee Charges Beating," The New York 
Times, 12 March 2004; Laura Peek and Steve Bird, "Beatings Not as Bad as Psychological Torture, Says Freed 
Briton," The Times, 13 March 2004; Rohde, "U.S.."  
171 For statements by Condoleezza Rice:  Richard Bernstein, "Rice's Visit: Official Praise, Public Doubts," ibid., 
11 December 2005.  Scott McClellan: Alan Cooperman, "CIA Interrogation under Fire," The Washington Post, 
28 December 2002.  The Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy and Human Rights: Alberts, "U.S. Report." 
172 "United States Calls for Elimination of Torture," M2 Newswire, 27 June 2002 2002.  See also The Defense 
Department general counsel in 2003:  Ruth Wedgwood, "Let Military Rules Apply While the War Goes On," 
International Herald Tribune, 2 December 2008.   
173 For statements by President Bush:  CNN, "Lou Dobbs Tonight," 15 December 2005.  Condoleezza Rice:  
Julian Borger, "Rice Speaks out against Torture of Detainees," The Guardian, 8 December 2005.  Alberto 
Gonzales: Nicholas Kralev, "U.S. Extends Torture Ban to Suspects Abroad," The Washington Times, 8 December 
2005.  A Pentagon spokesperson: Carol Rosenberg, "U..S. Bars Any Evidence Resulting from Torture," The 
Miami Herald, 23 March 2006.  
102 
 
 
 
allowed some reporters to visit the Guantanamo facility in early February 2002 to refute the 
claims of torture, Brigadier General Mike Lehnert stated that “the questioning that goes on 
is within the bounds of normal legal procedures that are in effect within the United 
States.”174  Despite a discourse in 2003 that did not mention domestic law directly, but 
instead referred to American standards or civil rights,175 direct appeal to solely domestic law 
did not reappear until 2005, when the Assistant Secretary of State for democracy, human 
rights and labor asserted that, “torture and other forms of abuse are absolutely verboten 
under U.S. law and policy for all agencies, including the intelligence agencies.”176  The idea 
that the administration adhered to the domestic law of the United States, which prohibits 
torture, was used by several officials up to 2007.177  Notably, Attorney General Michael 
Mukasey testified before Congress that the Justice Department would not investigate 
whether US interrogators broke the law when they waterboarded suspected terrorists 
because “whatever was done as part of a CIA program, at the time that it was done, was the 
subject of a Department of Justice opinion through Office of Legal Counsel – and was found 
to be permissible under the law as it existed then.”178   
International Society 
Challenging Claims 
This section will review all of the arguments that the other members of international society 
used that did not involve the legitimation of torture.  They can be broken up into two 
categories.  The first category consisted of challenges to claims that the United States did 
not abuse the detainees.  This discourse countered US attempts to avoid engagement in 
practices of legitimation with other members of international society.  The second was to 
call for investigations or ask for additional information on the nature of the abuses.  Again, 
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this brought focus on US conduct and forced the United States into a position where it 
needed to legitimate its behavior.  Few members of international society chose to engage in 
these discourses, instead focusing on moral and legal legitimation strategies over the abuse 
that was already publicized.  Of those that did, almost all were representatives of 
international organizations.   
International organizations publicly aired their concern about the abuses allegedly 
conducted by the United States between 2002 and 2005, though the discourse was rather 
sparse in frequency.179  For example, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Theo van Boven 
noted that, “detainees in Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, had been subjected to ‘stress and 
duress’ techniques during interrogation by the Central Intelligence Agency [and in 
particular] had allegedly been subjected to prolonged standing or kneeling, hooding, 
blindfolding with spray-painted goggles, sleep deprivation and 24-hour lighting, and were 
kept in painful or awkward positions.”180  However, not all international organizations 
reinforced the discourse that the United States was treating detainees poorly.  For instance, 
the head of European Union (EU) anti-terrorism, Gijs de Vries, stated in 2006 that there was 
no evidence to prove that the CIA had secret prisons in Europe, arguing that neither the 
European Parliament nor the Council of Europe investigations uncovered human rights 
abuses.181  From 2004 to 2006 international organizations tended to call for investigations of 
the allegations, request further information from the United States, or question whether 
current investigations were sufficient.182  A letter from the Special Rapporteur on Torture to 
the US government dated 22 October 2003 asked the administration for information 
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regarding the alleged conditions at the military base at Guantanamo Bay.183  European 
officials similarly vowed to investigate reports of mistreatment, stating that they “have to 
find out exactly what is happening.”184  This concern was extended with the revelation of 
CIA secret prisons.  Manfed Nowak argued several times that the existence of these facilities 
could indicate serious violations of human rights, especially since torture is more frequent in 
incommunicado detentions.185  Louise Arbour also expressed her concern several times, 
writing that she held that the “disappearance’ of those in the secret detention,  “in and of 
itself has been found to amount to torture or ill-treatment of the disappeared person or of 
the families and communities deprived of any information about the missing person.  
Furthermore, prolonged incommunicado detention or detention in secret places facilitates 
the perpetration of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”186  The ICRC 
asked the United States that, if these facilities did exist, a representative be allowed to 
visit.187   
Moral Legitimation Strategies 
Other members of international society pursued several moral legitimation strategies in 
response to the allegations of US treatment of detainees and US legitimation strategies.  
Some of the discourse supported the Bush administration by parroting back its messages.  
Some implicitly supported the treatment of the detainees through appealing to the danger 
of those held or the exceptional circumstances brought on by the security problems 
surrounding the terrorist threat.  Others corroborated the Bush administration’s position by 
arguing that particular interrogation techniques did not constitute torture, that the 
character of the American state would not allow torture to occur, or by reminding their 
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publics that despite the problematic conduct, the United States was a friend and ally.  These 
discourses point to some weaknesses in the norm as, all things being equal, a strong norm 
under threat will yield rather uniform responses criticizing the conduct or discourse of the 
offending member of international society.  The majority of the moral legitimation 
strategies, however, involved criticizing the United States for its conduct or legitimation 
strategies.  This included stating that they were morally appalled by the abuse, using the US 
conduct as a means to minimize their own human rights problems, issuing reminders that 
there should not be trade-offs between human rights and counterterrorism strategies, 
defining specific abuses as torture, and reminding the United States that it had a special role 
to play in the human rights system.   
No evidence of Abuse 
States in international society would, at times, declare that there were no problems with 
the human rights conduct of the United States, through declaring that there was no 
evidence that the detainees were being mistreated.  This was a relatively rare phenomenon, 
indicating that very few states believed that the United States was treating the detainees in 
an acceptable manner, at least enough to publicly support the United States.  For example, 
the British government defended the American treatment of the detainees in 2002, stating 
that among the three British detainees at Guantanamo Bay there were no complaints of ill 
treatment and they seemed to be in good physical health.188  This claim, however, was not 
as significant given that we know that the relative level of mistreatment was low at this 
time.  More noteworthy were similar claims regarding there being no evidence of the 
mistreatment of prisoners made by Australia between 2003 and 2005,189 and Denmark in 
2005.190  There was also one example of Western states attempting to avoid debate on the 
topic.  In 2004, Cuba presented a resolution to the UN Human Rights Commission calling on 
the Americans to open Guantanamo Bay for inspection by the United Nations Special 
                                                     
188 Andrew Sparrow, "Captives Have No Complaints, Says No 10," The Daily Telegraph, 22 January 2002.  
189 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, "Australia Says Guantanamo Detainees 'Treated Humanely'," Radio Australia, 8 
October 2003; Ian McPhedran, "Habib Trained before S11," Herald Sun 22 February 2005; Neil A Lewis and 
Brendan Nicholson, "Red Cross Accuses the US of Torture," The Age, 1 December 2004. 
190 Joel Brinkley, "Rice Appears to Reassure Some Europeans on Treatment of Terror Detainees," The New York 
Times, 9 December 2005. 
106 
 
 
 
Rapporteur on Torture and the Special Rapporteur on Arbitrary Detention.  Cuba also called 
for all European countries with citizens in Guantanamo, namely France, Sweden and Great 
Britain, to support the resolution.  Le Monde reported that the Europeans were having 
difficulties harmonizing their position on the resolution, with Sweden, Germany and Austria 
leaning towards abstention to send a clear signal to the Americans, while the United 
Kingdom and France wanted to put forward a procedural motion in order to avoid a difficult 
debate.  A Western diplomat admitted that, “We are in a very difficult situation … 
Guantanamo is the elephant in the room, everyone knows that it is there and everyone 
pretends to ignore it.”191   
Responses to US Legitimation Strategies 
Few states within international society chose to endorse key Bush administration moral 
legitimation strategies, suggesting a general failure in the United States to properly 
legitimate its preferences within international society as a whole.  Despite the paucity of 
support, the presence of these arguments also demonstrates that a norm that should be 
relatively entrenched, given its legal status, has not yet reached a fully taken-for-granted 
status within international society.  For instance, a handful of states echoed the Bush 
administration’s argument that either the detainees themselves or terrorism in general 
posed an extraordinary threat, potentially requiring new intelligence-gathering methods.192  
There was little support for the Bush administration’s claims concerning a less permissive 
interpretation of torture.  Only Australian Attorney-General Philip Ruddock stated that he 
believed the use of sleep deprivation could not constitute torture in interrogations, arguing, 
“some decisions will have to be taken as to what constitutes torture for the military 
commission process and those who are adjudicating the matter will determine that.”193  
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Other governments echoed the US discourse that the abuse was only due to the mistakes of 
a few people and did not represent a systemic problem.194  With respect to the abuse at Abu 
Ghraib, Britain was quick to acknowledge that “you shouldn’t judge the actions of the 
coalition as a whole on the basis of the actions of a few.”195  The British and Australians 
additionally argued that the United States was handling allegations of torture through 
proper procedures.196  These discourses might have been affected by the fact that many of 
these states were part of the “coalition of the willing’ responsible for the occupation of Iraq, 
but given that this was not the case for Germany, it suggests that participation in the 
occupation was not the only causal factor that account for this discourse.   
Other states within international society used legitimation strategies that referred to 
the nature of the state, how the United States had given them reassurances, or how they 
had a close relationship.  These discourses attempted to legitimate particular beliefs by 
focusing on the intrinsic legitimacy of the United States, either in its liberal democratic 
nature or in their relationship to it.  For instance, in 2002 German Foreign Minister Joschka 
Fischer warned about comparing a constitutional democracy like the United States to other 
torture regimes.197  The Prime Minister of Spain, Jose Zapatero, stated that those 
responsible for the crimes in Abu Ghraib should be held accountable, not for the United 
States in general, arguing that, “As I have confidence in US democracy ... I am sure that the 
perpetrators will be held responsible for their deeds.”198  President Bush noted in a press 
conference with Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Medgyessy that Medgyessy had brought 
up the problems of Abu Ghraib in their meeting, but noted that Medgyessy believed that 
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this incident did not characterize the US or the American people.199  Informed by this 
implicit nature, many states, particularly members of the EU, discussed how the United 
States gave them assurances that there was no torture taking place in 2005 and 2006.200  
For example, the British Foreign Secretary stated, “US policy is to comply with the UN 
Convention Against Torture.”201  International organizations also mentioned how the United 
States gave them reassurances that it was not torturing detainees.  UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights Sergio Vieira de Mello noted that, “the President assured me he had given 
instructions for torture not to be used and I take that as a very sincere, important 
statement.202  A few also reminded the public of the good relationship they had with the 
United States.  Germany stated that despite the abuse the US and Germany still worked as 
“close partners and friends,”203 and the Czech foreign minister Cyril Svoboda noted that 
trust among allies is important for an effective anti-terrorism struggle.204   
The United States Commits Prisoner Abuse or Torture 
States with good human rights records were very cautious in their use of the word ‘torture’ 
when referring to the conduct of the United States, whereas those with poor records used 
the term frequently.  States with good human rights records additionally did not call for 
investigations into the alleged mistreatment unless it was obvious, as in the case of Abu 
Ghraib.  Thus, although there was only a smattering of open support for US legitimation 
strategies, as we saw in the last section, there was also little opposition except from states 
with poor human rights records.  If the strength of a norm is measured by the response to it 
when it is under threat, as Hurd suggests, then this response was lukewarm at best.  This is 
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particularly the case if the United States was attempting to expand the definition of torture 
to include treatment that might have formerly been excluded.  According to Hurd’s method 
of determining legitimacy, if the norm had been firmly entrenched other members of 
international society would be expected to actively challenge this claim by stating that these 
actions are torture and forbidden.  Despite the lack of such a discourse from states with 
good human rights, it is important to note that the discourses of states with poor human 
rights records are strategically utilized to impose costs on the United States, which would be 
impossible if the norm itself was relatively weak.  As such, this strategic discourse lends 
some evidence to the fact that the norm is strong enough to be used in such a fashion.   
Some states with poor human rights records argued that the United States had failed 
to protect human rights,205 while others explicitly argued that the United States had 
committed torture.206  For instance, a member of the Iranian Guardian Council, Ayatollah 
Ahmad Jannati, stated that the United States will “now arrest, jail and torture whoever they 
want and force confession from them as well as confiscating their belongings.”207  Similarly, 
the Zimbabwean Minister of Information and Publicity, in responding to American criticism 
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over problems in a by-election in Zimbabwe, stated that the United States had lost the 
moral rights to judge others because of their, “racial profiling, illegal detention and torture 
of inmates under the guise of fighting terrorism.”208   
States with good human rights records declared that torture was taking place 
through their legal maneuvering, such as when Spain dropped an extradition request for 
two British residents formerly at Guantanamo Bay after stating that the torture they had 
suffered there made them too weak to stand trial.209  In general, Spain disallowed 
extraditions to the United States on the grounds that legal guarantees of the state could be 
violated.  Additionally, Dutch soldiers were ordered not to hand over Afghan captives to US 
forces for fear of abuse, deportation to Guantanamo or rendition.210  A British official told a 
parliamentary committee that the British government did not believe early reports of 
torture by the Americans, but after Abu Ghraib they became “fully aware of the risk of 
mistreatment associated with any operations that may result in U.S. custody of detainees.”  
Regarding the intelligence relationship after this point, he noted that “we still trust them, 
but we have a better recognition that their standards, their approaches, are different, and 
therefore we still have to work with them, but we work with them in a rather different 
fashion” without specifying what “a different fashion” entailed.211  Similarly, the House of 
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee released a report that similarly argued, “the UK can no 
longer rely on US assurances that it does not use torture, and we recommend that the 
government does not rely on such assurances in the future.”212  At other rare times their 
discourse was explicit, for instance, when the Italian Foreign Minister France Frattini 
claimed that the abuse at Abu Ghraib was torture.213  Similarly, British Foreign Secretary 
David Miliband argued in 2008 that, “We would never use waterboarding … There’s 
absolutely no question about the UK government’s commitments in respect of torture, 
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which is illegal, and our definition of what torture is.”214  International organizations also 
issued statements explicitly warning the United States to avoid the torture of detainees.215  
States with good human rights records would alternatively call for public explanations or 
investigations into the allegations of abuse or torture, but this occurred almost entirely in 
response to Abu Ghraib.216  In a rare counterexample, when the first photos from 
Guantanamo Bay leaked, then British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw had British 
representatives at Guantanamo Bay ask the Americans for an explanation.217   
Negative Moral Reactions 
Many states used discourses that described their moral outrage at the abuses perpetrated 
by the United States.  These discourses reinforced the moral prohibition against torture 
independently of the legitimation strategies employed by the United States.  Members of 
international society also reminded the United States not to operate as if there were direct 
trade-offs between successful intelligence techniques and committing torture.  However, 
these discourses generally occurred after large scandals like Abu Ghraib, suggesting that it is 
only when torture reaches a particular public frequency that other members of 
international society, particularly states, will react to reinforce the norm.  Many states with 
problematic human rights records used the exposure to contrast US conduct with their own, 
while others directly suggested that the United States had lost legitimacy in speaking out 
                                                     
214 David Gardner, "'Show Trial' Fears over 9/11 Suspects," Daily Mail, 13 February 2008.  
215 For statements by the OAS Commission on Human Rights:  Frank Griffiths, "24th Suicide Attempt at 
Guantanamo," Associated Press Worldstream, 1 April 2003.  Committee Against Torture:  ibid; Savage, 
"Monitors." Inter-American Human Rights Commission:  McCarthy, "Rights."  Manfred Nowak:  Neil Mackay, 
"Torture by UK and US 'Biggest Human Rights Threat since Nazis'," The Sunday Herald, 20 November 2005. 
216 See statements by Italy:  BBC Monitoring Europe, "Italian Daily Says Premier Less Enthusiastic About Iraq 
Mission," Il Sole, 11 May 2004.  Australia:  BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, "Australian PM Says US Abuses in Iraq 
'Body Blow to Anti-Terror Fight," Radio Australia, 11 May 2004.  Czech Republic:  BBC Monitoring Europe, 
"Iraqi Prisoners Abuse Should Be Investigated, Czech Minister," CTK News Agency, 11 May 2004.  Nicaragua:  
BBC Monitoring Latin America, "Nicaraguan Human Rights Officials Condemn Alleged US Abuse of Iraqi 
Prisoners," El Neuvo Diario, 4 May 2004.  Japan:  BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, "Japan Regrets Alleged Torture, 
Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners by US Soldiers," Kyodo News Service, 6 May 2004.  Germany:  BBC Monitoring Europe, 
"German Minister Seeks US Clarification over Torture Charges," DDP News Agency, 9 May 2004.  Denmark:  
"Danish Premier Sets out Agenda Ahead of Meeting USA's Bush," Danmarks Radio, 27 May 2004.  South Africa:  
BBC Monitoring Africa, "South Africa Expresses 'Deep Concern' over Torture of Iraqi Prisoners," SAPA, 4 May 
2004.  Indonesia:  BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, "Indonesian Foreign Minister Condemns US Treatment of Iraqi 
Prisoners," Detikcom, 11 May 2004. 
217 Gardiner, "Guantanamo." For a similar demand after Abu Ghraib, see Andrew Buncombe, "War on Terror:  
Guantanamo: Shocking Prisoner Abuses Are Revealed," The Independent, 4 August 2004. 
112 
 
 
 
against other human rights abuses.  In addition, and contrary to Brooks and Wohlforth, 
some states changed their policy regarding detainees in reaction to the detainee abuse 
despite the material advantage of the United States.  This added to US costs and suggested 
that though the material advantage might have helped to mitigate adverse reactions in the 
short term, it did not help to legitimate the Bush administration’s position.   
Many states claimed that they were shocked by the abuse, suggesting a moral 
prohibition against it, particularly after Abu Ghraib.218  For instance, the British government 
said it was “appalled by the photographs.”219  The Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel 
Moratinos equally expressed his “total horror” over the prison photos.220  International 
organizations also expressed their disapproval over the treatment of the prisoners221 and 
the UN Special Rapporteur on torture, Theo van Boven, stated that he was, “seriously 
concerned about recent reports of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
of Iraqi detainees by United States of America and United Kingdom military forces serving 
under the Coalition Provisional Authority.”222  The UN special representative in Afghanistan 
similarly argued about two prisoners who were reportedly tortured to death in 2002 that, 
“such abuses are utterly unacceptable and are an affront to everything the international 
community stands for in Afghanistan.”223  The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Louise Arbour, stated in 2005 that “It is appalling that even now we are entering an era 
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where we are even revisiting this [legal and moral] terrain … There are no circumstances 
where recourse to torture can ever be justified. End of debate.”224   
Many states also commented that the United States should be careful about the 
trade-offs between human rights and successful counterterrorism.  This was entirely a 
European discourse in 2004 and 2005, and was exemplified by German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel who stated that “we have to face the challenges of the 21st century … but we have 
to strike a careful balance.  We have to stay in line with the laws we believe in.”225  This 
discourse was also found among international organizations.226  The High Commissioner on 
Human Rights, Mary Robinson, stated in an interview with Le Temps that,  
I am also very concerned about the treatment of prisoners Taliban or Al 
Qaeda detainees in Afghanistan, they are under U.S. jurisdiction or 
Afghanistan. According to my information, their conditions of detention 
are alarming: they did not have enough to eat, they do not care, prisons 
are overcrowded, they are confined in the darkness ... Certainly, they can 
be questioned, but the questioning should not lead to abuse or torture.227   
Very few spokespersons, however, argued that torture was ineffective.  In a rare example, 
Louise Arbour wrote that, “Whatever the value of the information obtained in secret 
facilities – and there is reason to doubt the reliability of intelligence gained through 
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prolonged incommunicado or secret detention – some standards on the treatment of 
prisoners cannot be set aside.”228   
States with poor human rights records sometimes compared the conduct of the 
United States to their own conduct, suggesting that the United States did not have the 
moral standing to reprimand them.229  For instance, in a question from Der Spiegel in 2007 
Vladmir Putin defended his regime by criticizing the United States, arguing that “I am an 
absolutely true democrat.  The tragedy is that I am alone.  The Americans torture at 
Guantanamo, and in Europe the police use gas against protesters.”230  China suggested in 
2004 and 2005 that the United States should focus on its own problems instead of criticizing 
other states.231  Some states, notably Indonesia, made statements claiming that the reaction 
of international society to the scandal shows how international society discriminates 
between developed and developing states in terms of human rights promotion.232  Many 
states argued that the United States had lost its moral high ground or was acting 
hypocritically, though most were human rights abusing states themselves.  For instance, the 
Chinese government released a 2002 report criticizing the American human rights record, 
stating that the US had double standards whereby it actively engaged in “censuring other 
countries for their human rights situations ... [while turning] a blind eye to serious violations 
of human rights on its own soil.”  Specifically citing the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, it 
noted, “it was unclear ... what kind of treatment they would receive ... Former Al-Qaeda 
members were also subject to torture or other forms of maltreatment.”233  Some were quite 
explicit, such as an Indonesian Foreign Affairs Spokesperson who said in 2004 that “the US 
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Government has no moral authority whatsoever to make any evaluations or to stand as a 
jury on other countries including Indonesia in regard to Human Rights Issues, let alone after 
the cases of torture and harassment in Abu-Ghraib prison in Iraq.”234  This discourse was 
popular in states with human rights problems,235 but was also voiced by the Czech 
Republic.236  Some international organizations also argued that the conduct was 
undermining the status of the United States in the world.  Another was to discuss how the 
strength of American democracy was being eroded.  In responding to a question from Le 
Temps about Guantanamo, Louise Arbour stated: 
What was most disturbing after the events of September 11 in the United 
States was to see how the administration … abandoned what has always 
been its strength, namely the commitment and quality of all its institutions 
including the power of the judiciary.  The strength of American democracy 
is the exceptional attributes of the three branches of governance … 
Whatever the ultimate answer for the interpretation of the convention 
against torture and habeas corpus, what is important is that the these 
matters are referred to courts.237 
Manfred Nowak was even more explicit in his discussion of Vice President Cheney’s attempt 
to have the CIA excluded from a ban on torture, claiming that, “One of the cornerstones of 
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human rights is being put in question. This is undermining the reputation of the US as a 
democratic country based on the rule of law.”238 
Some members of international society suggested that US conduct could have larger 
effects on the international human rights system.  Both Germany and Austria reminded the 
US that it has a special role in the human rights system that torture would make 
problematic.239  Manfred Nowak claimed that, “the framework of international human 
rights which the UN has built up since 1945 is threatened when a democratic country 
undermines the total prohibition on torture.  … This should not be undermined by 
democratic states.  The world is more dangerous: on the one hand due to terrorists, and on 
the other due to actions taken in the fight against terrorism.”240  Louise Arbour similarly 
expressed frustration in 2007 at the US conduct, stating that “If I try to call to account any 
government, privately or publicly, for their human rights records, the first response is:  first 
go and talk to the Americans about their human rights violations.”241 
Legal 
Appeal to International Law 
Very few states appealed to international law in their discourse over the allegations of 
torture by the United States.  This reflects the moral legitimation discourses where very few 
states with good human rights records would state that the United States engaged in 
torture.  Some appealed to international norms,242 such as the government of South Africa 
which stated that, “the reports of abuse undermine the stated goals of the coalition forces 
to bring about a human rights-based culture and democracy in Iraq, under the rule of law, in 
line with international norms and standards.”243  A much rarer discourse, limited to states 
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with poor human rights records, was to challenge the United States on its legal 
interpretation of international humanitarian law.244   Equally as rare was bringing up 
humanitarian law at all, such as when the publication of the first Guantanamo photos led 
the British Prime Minister Tony Blair to argue that the prisoners needed to be treated in 
accordance with the Geneva Conventions.245  Again, this particular claim was made before 
the serious allegations of abuse took place, which leads to a question of why these more 
serious allegations did not trigger similar statements.   
International organizations, on the other hand, were more active in legitimating their 
preferences through legal argumentation, often arguing that detainees should be treated in 
accordance with international law generally.  Sometimes this was put in terms of 
International Human Rights Law, for example on 22 November 2001 the Committee Against 
Torture reminded state parties to the Convention Against Torture of “the non-derogable 
nature of most of the obligations undertaken by them in ratifying the Convention,” including 
the prohibition of torture under any circumstances and the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.246  UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Manfred Nowak 
stated similarly in 2008 that the US should give up on its defense of “unjustifiable” 
interrogation methods, arguing that, “this is absolutely unacceptable under international 
human rights law.”247  In 2007, the Committee Against Torture argued that because torture 
was difficult to differentiate torture from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, and since experience shows that the conditions that facilitate ill-treatment 
often facilitate torture, that the prohibition against ill-treatment is also non-derogable 
under the Convention.248  This shows that not only did international organizations reject 
Bush administration claims, but also clarified and strengthened existing international human 
rights law.  At other times the legal legitimation strategies were based on international 
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humanitarian law, such as when the ICRC reminded the media that, “International 
humanitarian law bans all forms of torture absolutely, regardless of the circumstances.”249  
At other times, international organizations referenced ‘international law’ without specifying 
which type.250   
In addition to appealing to international law in general, international organizations 
used legal legitimation strategies to call on the United States to bring perpetrators of 
detainee abuse to justice.251  However, the US was also commended in the same way, such 
as when the Norwegian member of the Committee Against Torture, Nora Sveaass, stated 
that the US representatives had given “very reassuring answers” with regards to bringing 
those responsible to justice.252  International organizations used legal legitimation strategies 
to remind the United States about command responsibility, which could make those at the 
top of the chain of command responsible for allegations of torture.253  They also classified 
certain interrogation techniques conducted by the United States to be legally torture or 
tantamount to torture.254  Finally, some international organizations argued that the United 
States did not have the legal competence to define torture by itself.255   
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Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the legitimation discourses of the Bush administration and other 
members of international society with respect to the United States’ treatment of detainees 
during the war on terror.  Specifically, it asked whether the Bush administration was 
successful in the legitimation of its preferences and whether its materiality seemed to play a 
role in the practices of legitimacy.   
The legitimation discourses of the Bush administration can be broken down into 
three overlapping periods.  The first set of discourses occurred before the Abu Ghraib 
scandal, from 2001 to 2004.  These involved several avoidance discourses, including outright 
denial that mistreatment was taking place, arguing that claims to the contrary were 
incorrect, and, early on, claiming that discussion of the exact interrogation techniques was 
impossible due to national security.  The Bush administration stressed both the unique 
threat posed by terrorism and the idea that the detainees were taught to lie to the media 
about alleged acts of torture.  At the same time, the Bush administration was also active in 
claiming that the detainees’ treatment reflected the standards of both international 
humanitarian and human rights law and, over time, became more explicit in describing the 
interrogation techniques involved.   
Once the Abu Ghaib and CIA secret prison scandals broke, in the period between 
2004 and 2006, the number of legitimation strategies increased considerably.  The Bush 
administration ended its denial discourses but continued the idea that some claims, 
particularly from international organizations, might be due to misinformation or were 
politically motivated.  It expanded its legitimacy strategy to emphasize not only the general 
threat caused by terrorism, but also the danger posed by the detainees themselves and the 
need for the state to gather actionable intelligence so the state could protect its citizens.  At 
the same time, it argued that the treatment of the detainees was respectful, that torture 
was immoral, and that all perpetrators of torture either were going to be brought to justice 
or, later on, had been brought to justice.  The Bush administration initiated legitimation 
strategies involving claims that the United States does not torture because it is not in its 
nature, that there were proper procedures in place, and that questioning was conducted by 
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professional interrogators.  Legally, it continued to appeal both specifically to international 
humanitarian or human rights law, but more often to the general international legality of 
the acts in general.  
We can see the utility of Luban’s theory of torture within liberal democracy playing 
out in the legitimation strategies of the United States during this period in particular, with 
the Bush administration’s stress on future-looking, structurally constrained action to avoid 
potential catastrophe.  This was particularly clear in its claims of the existence the exception 
danger of terrorism, the danger posed by the detainees themselves, its stress on the need 
to gather intelligence, their argument about the professionalism of the interrogators, and its 
argument that when scandals did occur they were the result of a few ‘bad apples’ who were 
appropriately punished.  These discourses, in sum, attempted to give the impression that 
the treatment that took place, whether considered torture or not, was not due to revenge, 
punishment or sadistic pleasure, but only to ensure that the greater catastrophe of a future 
terrorist attack could be avoided.  The treatment of the detainees, where questionable, was 
done reluctantly by professionals who had no other choice given the circumstances.    
In the last period between 2006 and 2008, almost all previous legitimation strategies 
fell by the wayside.  The few exceptions were a continuation of the state of exception 
argument, though this also declined in 2007 and 2008.  However, the appeal to proper 
procedures and the professionalism of the interrogators continued.  The Bush 
administration for the first time claimed outright that it did not torture, but at the same 
time made more statements that either challenged the idea of a firm definition of torture or 
presented exceptionally vague definitions of what would constitute torture.  From a legal 
perspective, all appeals to international law ended, replaced by appeals to the domestic 
legality of the interrogations.   
Within international society, there were very few legitimation discourses in the first 
period, with the exception of some international organizations claiming that there were 
problems with the way that the United States treated its detainees, some calls for 
investigations, and a few states with poor human rights records using the discourse of US 
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torture strategically to point out US hypocrisy in the matter.  It was only with the revelation 
of the Abu Ghraib scandal and the CIA secret detention centers that other members of 
international society became involved.  When this occurred, many claimed to be shocked by 
the abuse, called for investigations, reminded the US of balancing the trade-offs between 
counterterrorism and human rights, and concern that this conduct was undermining US 
legitimacy to defend human rights, particularly given its special role in the system.  The 
frequency of response between states and international organizations, however, varied.  For 
the former, the span of these legitimation discourses was much more acute than the latter, 
with almost all discourses occurring in 2004, whereas international organizations extended 
these discourses from as early as 2003 to as late as 2006.  Additionally, states within 
international society supported some of the US legitimation strategies during this period, 
either by reflecting on the extraordinary threat posed by terrorism, claiming that there was 
no systematic abuse by the US or that proper procedures were in place, or claiming that the 
United States had given them reassurances that torture was not taking place.  On the other 
hand, states with poor human rights records used the opportunity to either publicize the US 
abuses, claim that the United States was acting hypocritically and undermining its authority 
to speak on human rights, or attempted to downplay their own human rights problems by 
comparing them to those of the United States.   
During the final period between 2006 and 2008 most of these discourses 
disappeared, with the exception of claims that the abuse had undermined US authority, 
though this time mostly from states with good human rights records and international 
organizations.  International organizations continued to press the United States to give up 
any justification for the interrogation techniques that it championed.  Perhaps more 
problematically for the United States, other states within international society started 
changing state policy to reflect the risk of the United States torturing detainees in its 
custody.   
Reflecting this summary of the data on the central research questions, it seems that, 
given the absolute legal prohibition on torture, the Bush administration was relatively 
successful in avoiding costs of its potentially illegitimate activities, particularly at the 
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beginning of the administration’s term.  Whether the Bush administration was willing to act 
as an overt norm entrepreneur is somewhat unclear as there are only a few statements 
explicitly justifying its conduct in terms of the law, but this is not particularly surprising given 
that the norms that it would be contesting were seemingly quite entrenched within 
international law.  This corresponds with Schimmelfennig’s idea that actors are faced with 
external constraints from pre-existing norms, where they are forced to argue their case 
through these standards if the actor believes them to be sufficiently legitimate in 
international society.  This lack of direct appeal might indicate that the Bush administration 
was both aware of and felt constrained by the non-derogable nature of the torture norm.   
Thus, instead of attempting to pursue overt norm innovation, during the period 
between 2004 and 2006 when the United States faced the most criticism from other 
members of international society, the Bush administration attempted a policy of 
justification, or where the state attempts to legitimate its preference through claiming that 
it is in compliance with the norms as ‘properly’ interpreted.256  As such, the Bush 
administration was not attempting to challenge the torture norm in its entirety, but rather 
redefining the meaning of torture to permit actions that would not be previously 
permissible.257  This explains the conduct of both claiming legality, that it was in compliance 
with international law, coupled with moral legitimation tactics stressing that the treatment 
was respectful, that torture was immoral, that it had taken steps where interrogators have 
crossed the line, and explicitly outlined some of the interrogation techniques used, while at 
the same time reminding international society of the dangers of terrorism that required 
good intelligence so that the state could defend its citizens.  In other words, the Bush 
administration attempted to use the contradictions between the particular and unique 
situation that threatened citizens that it had a duty to protect, and pushing the boundaries 
of what might be acceptable interrogation techniques, all at the same time reinforcing that 
it does not ‘torture,’ which it declared to be immoral.   
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This strategy seemed to have some success within international society, as very few 
states commented negatively on US behavior, even when reports of mistreatment surfaced.  
This is possibly because the conduct of the United States was not sufficiently grievous to 
challenge it openly given the potential costs to any state of doing so.  However, given some 
statements reflecting on the importance of the United States in the human rights system, 
the silence might also have been a way of avoiding structural damage to the system through 
making the US a hypocritical, and therefore more illegitimate, actor.258  Even at the height of 
the scandals in 2004 and 2005, states with good human rights records made seemingly 
conflicting statements; first by claiming that they were shocked by the abuse and calling for 
investigations, second by echoing some American legitimation discourses that there was an 
extraordinary threat posed by terrorism, that there was no systemic abuse, or that the 
United States had given them reassurances.  This is particularly striking given that these 
supportive legitimation discourses were complementary with several introduced or 
augmented by the United States during this middle period, namely that the detainees were 
particularly dangerous, that there were proper procedures and professional interrogators in 
place, and that the perpetrators had been brought to justice.   
Despite this relative success given the purported stringency of the norm, as the term 
progressed there is evidence that the US ability to translate this mixed attitude into norm 
change was not successful.  First, international organizations exhibited a fervent opposition 
to the possibility of torture throughout, demonstrating their utility in promoting human 
rights norms in the face of state behavior that was less supportive.  They rarely engaged 
with the moral legitimation discourses of the United States, instead preferring to argue that 
torture was wrong, to call for investigations and occasionally to remind the United States of 
its special place in the international human rights system.  Legally, the international 
organizations were more apt to challenge specific claims that the United States made, while 
reaffirming existing international law and calling for investigations into alleged 
misbehaviour.  Second, there is some evidence that the United States attempted to coerce 
its allies into compliance based on comments made by European diplomats, suggesting that 
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legitimacy alone was not effective in producing compliance.  Third, some allies began to 
change their detainee policies at the end of the Bush administration, increasing the costs of 
interaction between themselves and the United States.   Lastly, the United States also faced 
constant criticism from states with poor human rights records.  While this latter observation 
is not the strongest evidence of the strength of the norm, it is important to note that even 
these actions demonstrate both that the norm was seen to be strong enough to be useful to 
these states, and that their discursive actions reproduced it.259  As a whole, the Bush 
administration did not seem to be successful in completely legitimating its preferences, at 
best reaching a position of norm emergence, but with little evidence of a norm cascade.     
This increased pressure that was a result of the Bush administration’s inability to 
legitimate its preferences is also confirmed by its retreat from international legitimation 
between 2006 and 2008, where it shifted to legal arguments based almost entirely on 
domestic law, moved away from explicit statements about the type of interrogation 
techniques used to statements that focused on the ambiguity of the term torture instead, 
and reaffirmed repeatedly that the United States does not torture instead of claiming that 
the detainees were treated respectfully.  This abandonment of arguments based on 
international law, the lack of confidence in a clear definition of torture and a direct 
confrontation of torture claims indicates that the United States had given up on any major 
attempt to reinvent the torture norm in the way that the earlier internal memos suggested, 
taking instead a very defensive posture.  This was also reflected in an evolution of domestic 
legislation that strengthened the torture norm, first outlawing it in the military in 2005, and 
second outlawing it for CIA intelligence agents in 2007.  This trend should not be overstated, 
because at the same time the Bush administration consistently argued that special 
interrogation techniques should be allowed in exceptional circumstances.  Additionally, this 
shift to legitimating domestic legal sources might have also helped to avoid issues of 
command responsibility, since their very restrictive definition of torture meant that there 
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was little to no conduct that would have been out of line with the legal recommendations of 
the Justice Department.  This is particularly the case given the public and private statements 
made by administration officials that suggested that the purpose of the alleged torture, that 
is, whether it was done to successful thwart a terrorist attack, would be taken into 
consideration when determining the legality of the action.  At the same time, the legal 
restrictions imposed by Congress certainty demonstrated a change in posture from the 
relatively unrestrictive definition of proper conduct put forward by the Bush administration 
at the beginning of the war on terror.  This suggests the Bush administration’s failure to 
legitimate its behavior in the long run created costs that it then attempted to avoid by trying 
to create a tolerable consensus balancing between its preferences and those of the rest of 
international society. 
This case study also seems to indicate that material preponderance did not help to change 
the norm, contra Brooks and Wohlforth.  However, this does not mean that US material 
power was of no use.  On the contrary, there is some evidence that it was effective in 
mitigating public criticism from the allies, which might explain the dual nature of other 
states” reactions in 2004, whereby states condemned the activity but were far less prone to 
condemn the United States itself.  This is supported by a European diplomat who in 2005 
claimed that the United States went on the offensive against European states in their 
allegations of torture.  However, there were clear limitations to this strategy, as towards the 
end of the term even coercion or bribery were either not effective, or judged to be too 
costly by the United States to implement at necessary levels to ensure compliance, leading 
to some allies making adjustments to their policies dealing with the relationship between 
detainees and the United States that negatively affected cooperation.  Thus, other than 
mitigating some of the negative responses, the material position of the United States did 
not seem to have much effect on its ability to legitimate its position and therein significantly 
change the norms of torture.   
